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Noura Raghdan Nader 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis investigates the democratic transition in Tunisia and the reasons behind its 
success. It starts by examining the nature of democracy and the different factors that 
affect democratic transitions. The role of political economy, social cleavages and 
struggle, institutions, religion, and political agents in democratic transitions is contrasted 
among Arab states and thoroughly examined in Tunisia’s case. This study showed how 
the circumstances became favorable for the Tunisian Uprising to occur in 2011 by 
presenting the history of Tunisia including the evolution of the Tunisian General Labor 
Union (UGTT) and the economic liberalization the country had undergone, in addition 
to highlighting the role of social media. Moreover, Tunisia was the only country among 
the Arab Spring countries that experienced authoritarian breakdown and was also able to 
embark on a successful democratic transition. The process of this democratic transition 
is comprehensively explored by analyzing the role of the military, interim government, 
electoral politics, and the drafting of the new constitution. Tunisia's political actors and 
elites were committed to protect their new democratic principles, the constitution-
making process was very inclusive and transparent, and the electoral reforms that were 
adopted gave a chance for other political parties to participate and compete in elections. 
The Arab spring was born in Tunisia and finally resulted in a successful democratic 
transition in the country. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Situating the Thesis 
 Until the Arab uprisings of 2010, “Middle Eastern exceptionalism” was one of 
the most important explanations of the robustness and persistence of authoritarian 
regimes in the Arab world. However, the Arab uprisings prompted a scholarly re-
examination of the viability of this argument. The Arab spring has not only impacted 
Arab states, but also the scholarship on Arab politics. Despite recent stagnation in 
political developments in the Arab world, there is almost unanimous agreement that the 
region is undergoing major political changes. Most of the countries that were affected by 
the Arab uprisings are either experiencing civil wars (Syria, Libya and Yemen), military 
rule (Egypt), or regime resilience (Bahrain).With the exception of Tunisia, a democratic 
transition has not been seen in the post-Arab Spring states. Much of this debate has been 
centered around the instantaneous and primary causes of the Arab uprisings, their nature 
and diverse trajectories in Arab spring states, and the impact of these remarkable events 
on the future of Arab politics. 
 What is the Arab spring? Can we think of it as a singular process or multiple 
processes? Before turning to these debates and the implications of the Arab Spring, it is 
important to briefly discuss the process of state formation in the region. 
 Political boundaries in the Arab world emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman 
empire. The process of state formation in the Arab world differed greatly from that of 
the European one. Adham Saouli argues that "boundaries in the Arab world came before 
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states and constituted the social environments within which states could form, deform or 
develop" (2015, p.318).This process of state formation proved to be a challenge for Arab 
regimes and, in order to eliminate competition, these regimes dominated and 
monopolized tools of violence. During the 1950s, republics like Yemen, Egypt, Syria, 
Libya and Iraq witnessed a process of increasing domination by the army over political 
and social life. Royal families in monarchical regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, 
directly controlled coercion and in some cases even forced certain ideologies to 
overcome tribal and religious divisions as was the case with Wahabism in Saudi Arabia. 
The economic sphere was also dominated either by oil-rich monarchies, strategically 
located states, or populist republics (Saouli, 2015). The domination of social life by 
Arab regimes led to a narrow political participation, and an increased susceptibility to 
internal (civil wars, Arab spring) and external (invasions, wars) shocks. Despite the 
hegemony of Arab regimes over private and public spheres, contentions between 
nationalists, Islamists, religious and sectarian communities persisted. 
 For the most part, politics in the Arab world has been authoritarian and 
undemocratic. This is not unusual due to the colonial experience in the Arab world. 
According to Rex Brynen, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh and Marie-Joelle Zahar, 
"the decolonizations of the interwar and post-World War II years often resulted in 
authoritarian politics or produced the politics of fragility and internal violence- and in 
many cases a bit of both" (2012, p.4). In fact, the prevalence of authoritarianism in the 
Arab world was very similar to other developing countries and to Eastern Europe at the 
time. However, the "third wave of democratization" that started in Latin America in the 
1970s and continued to Eastern Europe in the 1990s did not reach the Arab world 
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(Huntington, 1991). With the possible exception of Lebanon, authoritarianism persisted 
elsewhere in the region. 
 Scholars have provided different explanations in explaining the democratic 
deficit in the Middle East and academic literature covering Arab authoritarianism was in 
fact focused on analyzing and understanding regime stability and not on the actual 
politics in the region. Much of the explanation covering Arab authoritarianism has 
centered around: state rentiersim, Islamic laws and culture, the importance of tribal and 
ethnic relations, and gender suppression. The existing literature on Middle Eastern 
politics revolved around three categories: the essentialist, the contextualists, and the 
critical (Brynen et al, 2012). Essentialists regard culture to be highly resistant to change 
as it is deeply rooted in religion, history and social organization. Contextualists maintain 
that although culture is important, it is subject to change and variation. On the other 
hand, critics argue that political economy and institutional legacies are much more 
imperative than the analysis of political cultures (Brynen et al, 2012). Political Culture 
has always been the most popular theory used to explain authoritarian resilience in 
MENA region. Two important factors have been accused of impeding the 
democratization process in the Arab world. First, Islam as a religion was regarded 
inherently incompatible with democracy. Second, the Arab society has been 
characterized as tribal and patriarchal. Therefore, political parties and formal 
organizations and institutions can never lead to a political change. However, 
authoritarian persistence in the region was not due to Islam or to tribal and patriarchal 
networks. In fact, it was the result of certain social and economic policies that were 
applied systematically by authoritarian Arab regimes. 
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 Arab regimes manipulated a number of formal institutional mechanisms such as 
elections, political parties and association laws, monarchial liberalization and hereditary 
succession to avoid political reforms that would have eventually led to the weakening of 
authoritarian regimes (Brynen et al, 2012). Also, Arab regimes organized and re-
organized social pacts in order to control political life in their countries. "At the heart of 
these social pacts were neopatrimonial networks and strategies that sought to reward and 
sanction regime supporters and opponents, narrow the scope of civil society collective 
action, and disrupt opposition organization" (Brynen et al, 2012, p.289). Moreover, 
cultural and symbolic modes of production were monopolized and dominated by Arab 
regimes. As such, the Arab media's main agenda was to depoliticize and entertain the 
public through sports or cultural programs. Additionally, Arab regimes supported art, 
but only to shrewdly introduce them as means to undermine opposition and creative 
thinking (Brynen et al, 2012). 
 Arab regimes faced serious internal threats in the period between 1970 and 2010: 
Oman in the early 1970s; Syria in the late 1970s and early 1980s; Egypt in 1977 and the 
mid 1990s; Jordan in 1970-71, 1989, and 1996; Algeria in the 1990s; Saudi Arabia in 
1979-80 and the mid 1990s, Iraq in 1991. Arab regimes relied on their militaries and 
security services to quell such uprisings (Gause, 2011). The scholarly community failed 
to predict these popular upheavals. This time, however, the violence, manipulation and 
domination deployed by Arab regimes against their citizens has failed to protect them 
from the demonstrations that swept the Arab world starting in December 2010. The 
world watched in awe as Arab citizens revolted against years of tyranny and 
authoritarianism. Scholars and journalists were quick to identify these uprisings as the 
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"Arab Spring" and associate them with democratization. Despite similar conditions 
leading to popular uprisings in the Arab world, the paths commenced by Arab spring 
states differed greatly. In some countries, authoritarian regimes collapsed, while others 
faced more protracted resistance. Although many post-Arab Spring states are 
experiencing civil wars and state fragmentation, Tunisia is widely seen as having the 
most successful democratic transition. 
 Today, the future of post-uprising Arab Spring states seems dark. For many, the 
Arab Spring has failed to democratize the region. Regional and international 
considerations that had apparently been marginalized at the beginning of the Arab 
uprisings, returned to the center of the Arab Spring. Moreover, while almost all the Arab 
citizens were receptive to the initial Arab protests, the majority of the Arab countries 
were able to avoid mass protests. Joshua Statcher argues that "The Arab uprisings' most 
visible product to date has been the militarization of politics and societies seen in an 
expansion of state violence against the citizenry, producing a qualitative change in state-
society relations"(2015, p.260). The current landscape of the Arab world has led many 
observers to pronounce the death of the Arab Spring. However, the changes that started 
in 2011 are irreversible. Although the democratic transition in most post-uprising Arab 
Spring countries has been stalled, it does not mean that the region is currently 
undergoing a reversal wave. The Arab Spring and the success of the democratic 
transition in Tunisia have shown the significance of place, time and structural factors in 
explaining regime changes and prospects for democratic transitions in the region. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
 What then explains the success of the democratic transition in Tunisia compared 
to other post-uprising Arab states? After years of wondering why there are only a few 
democracies in Muslim countries and none in the Arab world, recent events have 
brought hope of a possible fourth wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). The 
current perception of the Arab uprisings, with the exception of Tunisia, is that they were 
unsuccessful in bringing the long-awaited democratic transition in the region. But why 
was Tunisia successful? If the uprisings in the Arab world were caused by comparable 
reasons across the region, why were the trajectories of post-uprising Arab spring states 
divergent? 
To answer these question, several topics need to be examined: What are the 
reasons behind the successful democratic transition in Tunisia? Were there any pre-
requisites that enabled the democratic transition in Tunisia to move forward? If so, why 
did these same pre-requisites impact other Arab Spring states differently? Why did the 
Tunisian uprising, which led to the other uprisings, start in 2011 and not before? Is 
timing a decisive factor in the success of the Tunisian democratic transition? 
A break from authoritarian rule does not necessarily mean that the transition 
towards democracy can be considered a successful one. In order to understand why 
Tunisia is considered an exception to other post-uprising Arab states, it is important to 
define what constitutes a successful democratic transition. This entails an examination of 
the process of state building in Tunisia to have a better understanding of the different 
societal and ideological cleavages that are still playing an important role in Tunisian 
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politics. Furthermore, a more thorough analysis of the geopolitical, economic and 
international factors should be applied to Tunisia. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 This thesis is a single case study in which the democratic transition from 
authoritarian rule in Tunisia is analyzed. The holistic factors particular to the Tunisian 
case will be examined to understand the reasons behind the successful democratic 
transition. Democratization theories will be used as a starting point and as a guideline for 
this research. Moreover, to fully understand this transition, the research will be based on 
the secondary literature relevant to the proposed study, plus desktop research in which 
journals and reports are used. After the material on democratic theory is examined and 
analyzed and the information about the Tunisian case is gathered, an attempt will be 
made to understand the “exceptionalism” of Tunisia in regard to its experience with 
democracy, as opposed to the experiences of the other Arab Spring states. Different 
aspects will be considered throughout the analysis including an understanding of the 
social and economic conditions at the time of the uprising, in addition to the role of 
social media. As such, this analysis will explain the reasons which led to the uprising 
transpiring in 2011 and not before; and will also show how some of these variables at 
the time facilitated, in turn, the later democratic transition in Tunisia. 
 One of the unavoidable paradoxes of academic literature covering post-
authoritarian regime breakdowns and democratic transitions and consolidations is the 
considerable disagreement on how to define or measure democracy. Since democracy is 
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always a continuous variable, a consensual definition does not exist. Therefore, for this 
research Linz and Stephan’s (1996) definition of democratic transitions will be adopted. 
In this thesis, Tunisia’s political system will be evaluated against this definition to 
assess the democratic transition in the country. 
 
1.4 Map of the Thesis 
 In the second chapter the theoretical framework is central. Theories on 
democratic transition are presented and discussed. Different factors and agents that 
played an important role in the democratic transition will be explored. Moreover, the 
chapter presents a brief overview of the uprisings in other Arab Spring states. The third 
chapter focuses on the Tunisian uprising. The particularities of the Tunisian state will be 
presented and analyzed. This chapter discusses why the Arab Spring started in Tunisia at 
that particular time. Thus, a historical, economic and political analysis of Tunisia is 
applied. The fourth chapter focuses on the process of democratic transition in Tunisia. 
The chapter focuses on the process of constitution-making and electoral reforms in 
Tunisia. The fifth and final chapter, explains the Tunisian puzzle: how come Tunisia is 
the only country in the Arab Spring states to witness a successful democratic transition. 
Moreover, it contemplates the future of the Arab Spring and its impact on the MENA 
region. 
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Chapter Two 
The Factors Affecting Democratic Transitions 
2.1 Introduction 
In December 2010, massive and sustained public demonstrations demanding 
political freedom and regime change cascaded from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen, Jordan 
and Bahrain. In turn, this inspired the citizens of Syria, Libya and Morocco to take to the 
streets to call for change. 2011 was an extraordinary year in the Arab world. Following 
the swift fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt and Qadhafi in Libya, many 
predicted that democratization has finally overcome "Middle East exceptionalism". 
Nonetheless, the impact of the Arab Spring came to be much more modest than what 
observers initially predicted. Of all the Arab Spring states today, the democratic 
transition in Tunisia is the most successful. According to Barbara Geddes (1999), there 
is a wide gap between authoritarian breakdown and the realization of an effective regime 
change or a successful democratic transition. It is one thing to remove an authoritarian 
leader and another to create a stable democracy. With the exception of Tunisia, the 
shared outcome of the Arab Spring was state collapse and sectarian, tribal, or ethnic 
wars. 
 This chapter examines the literature on democratic transitions in general, with a 
special focus on the uprisings of the Arab Spring states. It surveys the literature on 
uprisings and the factors that contribute to the success of democratic transitions. The 
literature review will be interpreted against the Tunisian case. It also discusses the 
different trajectories that resulted in various Arab Spring states. It concludes by 
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suggesting that Tunisia is endowed with certain conditions that are favorable to 
democratic transition. 
 
2.2 Explaining Democratic Transitions 
 Guillermo O'Donnell (1992) differentiates between "transitions from 
authoritarian rule" and "democratic consolidation". The two distinct processes should be 
considered as two different transitions. While the first transition aspires to destabilize 
authoritarianism, the second transition involves an on-going process of introducing new 
democratic values and rules to the political sphere. This distinction is astute in order to 
understand democratic transitions more clearly in post-authoritarian countries.  
 Adam Przeworksi (1991) identifies four main actors usually involved in the 
process of democratic transitions: hard-liners and soft liners of the regime, and the 
moderates and radicals of the opposition. O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter define 
transitions in the following way: "Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the 
launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by 
the installation of some form of democracy, the return of some authoritarian rule, or the 
emergence of a revolutionary alternative" (1986, p.6). 
 The central theme in transitions is uncertainty. The rules of the political game are 
not clearly defined and political agents struggle to satisfy their interests. O'Donnel and 
Schmitter explain that transitions occur when a split occurs between hard-liners and soft-
liners of a given regime. Democratic transition starts when authoritarian rulers attempt to 
modify their rules to secure more rights to different groups and individuals. As much as 
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it is important to understand the impact of the split between hard-liners and soft-liners 
on democratic transitions, it is equally imperative, if not more challenging, to understand 
why did the splits emerge when they did?. As Przeworski argues "the response to the 
question, 'Why did communism collapse?' is not the same as to 'Why did it collapse in 
the autumn of 1989?'" (1999, p.1). 
 The Arab spring raises similar questions. While it is crucial to understand why 
the Arab spring occurred, it is also important to explain as well why Tunisia was the first 
country to witness these uprisings in December 2010. Why wasn't a leading Arab 
country, like Egypt, the first to host these protests? Moreover, it is equally important to 
understand the timing of the Tunisia's authoritarian breakdown. Why did the Tunisian 
uprising take place in December 2010 and not before? 
 One concept of democratic transitions that is often overlooked is the very nature 
of transitions. A central argument that should be further inspected is that democratic 
transitions are neither linear nor rational. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) used the term 
"plasticity" to best describe democratic transitions. In other words, political actors have 
different choices that not only initiate and move transitions forward, but also contribute 
in constructing different institutions. However, political choices in democratic 
transitions definitely do not imply that the choices are randomly decided upon. In fact, 
the relative power of political actors is the key factor in deciding what form of 
institutional design is agreed on. Context is also essential in the study of democratic 
transitions. "Patterns of transition come in very different forms and, we need to look 
closely at the contexts of transitions" (Adeny & Taggart, 2015, p.334). Hence, in order 
to understand why the democratic transition in Tunisia was successful as opposed to 
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other Arab spring states, we cannot treat the Arab world as a singular homogeneous 
entity. Therefore, a contextual analysis of Tunisia's democratic transition will be applied 
in this work. This, in turn, means we need to consider and measure democracy in a way 
that is receptive to how it is understood and therefore what it means in different 
contexts. Moreover, relying solely on Polity and Freedom Houses indexes leads to a 
narrow set of indicators that are produced by political and ideological constructs (Adeny 
& Taggart, 2015, p.330). 
 One of the unavoidable paradoxes of academic literature covering post-
authoritarian regime breakdowns and democratic transitions and consolidations is the 
considerable disagreement on how to define or measure democracy. Since democracy is 
always a continuous variable, a consensual definition does not exist. "What seems clear 
is that democracy is more of a plural term and we need to consider some very different 
patterns of how it functions and how it develops. We also need to be sensitive to an 
over-eager optimism about the necessary transition to democracy" (Adney & Taggart, 
2015, p.334). 
 How can we then measure the success of democratic transitions? What factors 
contribute to a smooth transition to democracy? Linz and Stephan (1996) apply a 
theoretical framework to describe and analyze democratic processes in South Europe, 
South America and post-communist Europe. These regions were carefully chosen for 
study since South Europe had already established a consolidated democracy, South 
America had entered an unconfirmed democracy and post-communist Europe was 
undergoing a transition towards democracy. Moreover, the authors present a new 
typology for political systems that goes beyond the dichotomous authoritarian and 
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democratic regimes. Instead, they classified regimes into five categories: 
authoritarianism, totalitarianism, post- totalitarianism, democracy and sultanism. 
 For this research Linz and Stephan’s definition of democratic transitions will be 
adopted. According to the authors: 
  A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached 
about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes 
to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de 
facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and 
judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other 
bodies de jure (1996, p.3) 
 Understanding democratic transitions also entails understanding the role of 
different factors affecting transitions. Why do established authoritarian countries decide 
to head for democratization? Are there any obstacles that render a successful democratic 
transition impossible? Is a bad economic outcome inevitable after a democratic 
transition? 
 The modernization thesis holds that economic development eventually leads to 
democracy. In other words, economic performance is a necessary contiguous dynamic 
that precedes transitions toward democracy. "Economic development is a sufficient, 
rather than a necessary, condition for democratic transitions. As long as the economy 
continues to grow, so does the prospect for a democratic transition" (Kugler & Feng 
1999, p.140). Although high economic development can be used as an index for the 
democratization of nations, other dynamics can also produce the same result. The 
process of democratic transition can be materialized through a delicate balance of 
negotiations between an authoritarian regime and a democratic opposition. Hence, 
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different political agents are affected by the uncertainty of events. "Game theory is 
particularly useful in studying the impact on democratic transitions of uncertainty and 
incomplete information because it allows incomplete and/or imperfect information to 
condition the actors' choice affecting the resulting equilibria of the game" (Kugler & 
Feng, 1999, p.142). Therefore, a combination of political negotiations and high levels of 
economic performance can both lead to a democratic transition. Michael K. Miller 
(2012) finds that although economic development is favorable to democracy, it may also 
stabilize autocracies. Moreover, he argues that for the past 135 years, violence has been 
an essential component of democracy and democratic transitions. Miller defends a new 
theory linking democratic transitions, economic development and violent turnover. He 
regards that development does indeed strengthen autocratic regimes due to a low 
probability of violent leader removal. Nonetheless, if a violent leader removal has 
occurred in the recent past, greater development tends to lead to democratization. 
 This finding has an important implication for democratic transitions in the Arab 
world. According to Miller, "it is an intriguing paradox that democracy is inherently 
peaceful, but violence is not only compatible with democratization, it is an essential 
component of democratic development over the last 135 years" (2012, p.35). This 
indicates that although post-uprising Arab Spring states are currently experiencing high 
level of violence, democratic transition will eventually take place.  
 Fareed Zakaria argues that "although democracy has in many ways opened up 
African politics and brought people liberty, it has also produced a degree of chaos and 
instability that has actually made corruption and lawlessness worse in many countries" 
(2003, p.98). In fact, the aftermath of the Arab spring has left many yearning for the pre-
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2010 Arab world. Nowadays, observers and Arabs are finding it increasingly hard to be 
optimistic regarding the future of democratic transition and consolidation in the region. 
Thus, it is important to identify whether democratic transitions necessarily produce bad 
economic outcomes. Does a democratic transition in a developing country lead to 
conflicts and chaos? Studies show that major democratic transitions have had positive 
effects on economic growth. Moreover, "it is more probable that democratization takes 
place after periods of low growth and not precede them" (Rodrik & Wacziarg, 2005, 
p.50). The claim that democratic transition negatively affects economic growth, suggests 
that some might use this as a poor excuse for not following up on promised political 
reforms. 
 
2.3 The Role of Political Economy in Transitions 
Jamie Allinson (2015) and Raymond Hinnebusch (2015) argue that political 
economy is an important factor when studying democratic transitions. Allinson points 
out that applying the political culture theory to explain the failure of democratic 
transitions is flawed. Putting too much emphasis on the Sultanistic character of the 
regimes or the role of religion in public life, rules out the political economy analysis of 
the respective social bases of the actors. “The transition approach thus misses the role of 
the working class, and the strong correlation between the strength of labour movements 
and the winning of the minimal democratic rights in the region” (Allinson, 2015, p.295).  
This requires a critique at the deeper level of the historical sociology of the working 
class agency. Allinson states that focusing on the “three clusters of powers”- the balance 
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of class forces, degree of state autonomy, and the geopolitical conjuncture- can explain 
the different transition trajectories. The independence of the working class in Tunisia is 
considered an important factor for the success of democratic reform. In analyzing the 
democratic transitions in the Arab world, the notion of 'class character' rarely appears in 
literature. On the other hand, "the word 'Islamist' appears 12 times in Alfred Stephan's 
article on Tunisia and 'secularism' seven: while 'trade union' features once and 'labour', 
'worker' and 'Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail' (UGTT) not at all, despite the 
centrality of the organization to the fall of Ben Ali" (Allinson, 2015, p.297). Moreover, 
Allison adds that an explicit class-analysis for the Arab uprisings is necessary because 
cross-class ideologies and identities are prominent in most Arab states. In summary, the 
balance of class forces interacted with degrees of state economy and geopolitical 
interests differently in each Arab spring country. The state of Tunisia had a considerable 
distance from the ruling clan and a unidirectional association with foreign powers. 
Hence, the democratic transition in Tunisia was successful as opposed to the other Arab 
Spring states, like Egypt and Syria, where their economy was interlinked with the state 
and the ruling regimes. 
 Hinnebusch adopts a neo-Gramsician framework and examines how the political 
economy and the international context affect the democratization process in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA). For Hinnebusch, neo-liberal policies adopted by 
autocratic regimes in the MENA region generated crony capitalism. Although these neo-
liberal policies initially sparked the uprisings, they have failed to address class 
inequalities. According to Hinnebusch, the Western and regional intervention negatively 
affected the uprisings and deterred democratization. However, the situation in Tunisia 
 17 
was different. “In this context, the least bad outcome was the ‘low intensity democracy’ 
that appeared possible in Tunisia where long-term Western cultural penetration may 
indeed have assisted democratic consolidation” (Hinnebusch, 2015, p.350). An inverse 
relationship between, the impact of external- global and regional- interferences and, with 
the likelihood of democratization exists. As an example, in Tunisia, where the 
relationship is balanced, “low-intensity democracy" resulted. However, where the 
relationship was most intense (Syria and Libya) the outcome was failed states 
(Hinnebusch, 2015). 
 
2.4 The Role of Social Cleavages in Transitions 
 Philippe C. Schmitter (2012) and Vincent Durac (2015) point out that severe 
social cleavages are responsible for the failure of democratic transitions in the MENA 
region. While Schmitter agrees with Hinnebusch (2015) that causes such as political 
economy and international factors, affect the road to democratic transition, social 
cleavages remain the most important factor. Schmitter describes the process of 
democratization as an ambidextrous one and makes the distinction between real-existing 
democracies (RED) and ‘hybrid-regimes’. He states that patterns of internal social 
cleavage, imperatives of a capitalist system of production and distribution, and security 
threats and alliance constraints, affect the citizens’ acquisition of human rights and civic 
freedoms during democratic transitions. However, he insists that there are no pre-cursors 
for democratic transitions. Any country can become democratic, but for some, there will 
be varying degrees of difficulty. 
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 Durac uses the social movement approach to study the different trajectories of 
the Arab uprisings. Initially, the youth-led movements were leaderless and non-
ideological. However, as the protest movements spread, “they grew to encompass a 
diverse array of other movements and actors: political activists, opposition political 
parties, trade unions, lawyers, journalists and other professional groups, Islamist 
movements and parties, and, in some cases, regionally-based actors” (Durac, 2015, 
p.253). Durac argues that the diversity of these movements made the attainment of the 
main demands (regime change) possible; nonetheless, the perseverance of severe 
ideological differences within these movements, made the concurrence of the post-
regime political order almost impossible. A striking feature in the Arab spring uprisings 
was the non-ideological and leaderless movements. Later, these youths were joined by 
organized political parties. After the fall of some Arab regimes, ideological differences 
between them increased which, in turn, greatly hindered the democratic transition 
process. As the two movements were busy negotiating terms of agreements amongst 
themselves, several political openings were missed. According to Durac, the democratic 
transition in Tunisia was possible only because a dialogue between the different 
opposition members- and an agreement about the shape of post-Ben Ali order- had 
already taken place almost a decade ago. By the time of the uprisings, the Tunisian 
opposition forces, unlike other Arab Spring states, had already reached a relative degree 
of consensus regarding the nature of post-Ben Ali Tunisia (Durac, 2015). Tunisia was 
the only country where an anti-regime movement was able to mobilize itself into a 
solidified entity after authoritarian breakdown. By contrast, the failure of anti-regime 
movements in other Arab-spring states to reach any form of agreement, led to their 
marginalization. 
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2.5 The Role of Social Struggle in Transitions 
 The Norwegian Nobel Committee chose to award the 2015 Nobel Prize to 
Tunisia's National Dialogue Quartet for its contribution to a peaceful dialogue. The 
Quartet has comprised four key organizations in Tunisian civil society: the UGTT, the 
Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian 
Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers. Tunisia's National 
Dialogue was portrayed as a heroic figure that was able to negotiate with Tunisia's 
Islamists without negatively affecting the newly established democratic institutions. 
While this award highlights the new commitment to democracy and social justice in 
Tunisia, it does not convey the reality of Tunisian politics. Joel Beinin (2015) criticizes 
the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s award choice and suggests that the intense social 
struggle that took place in Tunisia was the real reason behind the successful democratic 
transition. The Noble Committee's ‘constructed narrative’ ignores the social struggle led 
by the UGTT which was able to break Tunisia’s political deadlock and force Ennahda, 
an Islamist political party, to compromise (Beinin, 2015). The UGTT was portrayed as a 
mediator between secularists and Islamists. However, in reality, the UGTT, the largest 
civic organization in Tunisia, led massive protests in October 2013 that eventually 
forced Ennahda to join the Quartet. 
 The rise of violent extremists in Iraq and Syria and the coup against Egyptian 
president Morsi in July 2013, posed serious threats to the democratic transition in 
Tunisia. Moreover, the assassination of Mohamad Brahimi, an MP in the leftist front 
(Jebha Chaabia), on July 25, 2013 dramatically exacerbated the situation (Marks, 2015). 
Thousands took to the street calling for the immediate resignation of the government led 
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by Ennahda. For weeks Ennahda and Nida Tunis, an unelected leftist opposition, 
competed for political power. The critical period in Tunsia's democratic transition came 
to an end when Ennahda decided to step down from power. The parallel events 
witnessed in Egypt and the rise of extremists compelled Ennahda to voluntarily resign 
due to the effects of political diffusion in the area. “The coup in Egypt, paired with the 
assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, severely constricted Ennahda’s margin of strategic 
maneuver, rendering pursuit of lustration legislation politically impossible” (Marks, 
2015, p.10). The Egyptian coup against Morsi forced Ennahda to realize that the rewards 
for speaking up in favor of ideological Islamist issues does not outweigh the political 
risks ahead. 
 
2.6 The Role of Institutions in Transitions 
 Larry Diamond (2015), Sami Zubaida (2012) and Julia Strasheim and Hanne 
Fjelde (2012) focus on the role of institutions during transitions to democracy. 
According to the authors, strong and developed institutions can support democratic 
transition and manage differences in societies. Diamond analyzes the democratic deficit 
or the democratic failure in the last decade. He highlights the importance of institutions 
in democratic consolidation and uses the pace of democratic decay in South Africa as an 
example. According to Diamond, state structures with “neo-patrimonial” tendencies are 
“too often weak and porous- unable to secure order, protect rights, meet the most basic 
social needs... Democratic institutions such as parties and parliaments are often poorly 
developed” (Diamond, 2015, p.149-150). Diamond adds that states that lack democratic 
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institutions fail in managing the ethnic, religious and other identity cleavages. Countries 
with poorly developed democratic institutions, usually lack democratic checks and 
balances. Hence, leaders assume that they can hoard power and wealth for themselves 
and for their close network. Naturally, this will exacerbate economic inequalities and the 
abuse of power which negatively effects countries transitioning to democracy.  
 Zubaida agrees with Diamond and adds that more attention should be given to 
political history, and therefore to the post-independence regimes in the countries, in 
order to have a better understanding of the different post-uprisings outcomes. The 
central demands of the Arab Spring were not about religion, nationalism or the Arab-
Israeli conflict, rather, people were calling for economic liberty, democracy and political 
freedom. Nonetheless, "lurking in the shadows of these events religious and tribal 
politics were never far away, and came to manifest themselves soon enough" (Zubaida, 
2012, p.569). Zubaida argues that crony capitalism reinforced communal and religious 
identities which came to the fore when the regimes were replaced. By building effective 
institutions to support democracy, communal and religious identities will be well 
managed. Although strong institutions are needed, it is equally important that the 
governing body, managing these institutions, enjoys legitimacy and support from the 
international and local community. 
 The management of transitional governments, although adopted by the 
international community, is heavily criticized. "Local-ownership" of transitional regimes 
is important in order to ensure that sovereignty is vested within the local population 
(Strashein & Fjelde, 2012). The construction of institutions is a very delicate process 
during democratic transitions. It is a "process in which what is deemed desirable is 
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merged with what is deemed possible to build or regulate elements of a polity to build 
democratic governance" (Strashein & Fjelde, 2012, p.339). Apart from strong 
institutions, Julia Strasheim and Hanne Fjelde propose that decentralization positively 
affects democratic transitions. They analyze 15 interim regimes between 1989 and 2006. 
Their study concludes that executive constraints and decentralization are closely 
intertwined with democratization. The authors argue that in post-conflict countries, 
policy makers should “aim at checking executive power in the center, but boost 
government authority outside the capital” (Strashein & Fjelde, 2012, p.351). Thus, a 
strong state, with decentralized powers, diffuses political power and reduces the zero-
sum character of the political competition during transition. Moreover, a strong 
executive power should be established in order to keep domestic elites tied to their initial 
commitments. According to the authors, executive constraints are positively associated 
with chances of post-conflict democratization. Furthermore, decentralization advances 
economic development and is central for democratic development. 
 
2.7 The Role of Religion in Transitions 
  Conflicts over religion were not prominent in Europe during the 'third wave of 
democratization'. Thus, religion was under theorized in scholarly writing. However, 
Islam played a significant role in the Arab uprisings and thus, the relationship between 
religion and democracy should be examined. Alfred Stephan and Juan J. Linz (2013) and 
Fredric Volpi and Ewan Stein (2015), focus on the role of Islamist parties in the Arab 
spring uprisings. Volpi and Stein (2015) discuss the different trajectories of Islamists 
 23 
during and after the Arab uprisings. They make the distinction between statist Islamist 
and non-statist Islamist, and focus on the nature and degree of transformation of state-
society relations. Statist Islamism is defined as the "institutionalized participation in the 
politics of the nation state" by Islamist groups (Volpi & Stein, 2015, p.281). Statist 
Islamists are not revolutionaries and do not seek to overthrow existing social orders. 
Rather, their discourse can be seen as a challenge to the more secular establishment. 
Instead of challenging social hierarchies, they focus their attention on corruption, and 
the moral laxity and neglect of religion (Volpi & Stein, 2015). This variant of Islamist is 
seen in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunis, Sahwa movement in Saudi 
and Islah in Yemen. "Non-statist Islamism is not so much "apolitical" as it is "infra-
political" (Volpi & Stein, 2015, p.282). Non-statist Islamists seek to constitute an 
Islamic society, a trend most obvious in jihadism and Salafism, and tend to avoid formal 
political participation.  
 The choices that were made during the Arab uprisings by the statist Islamists 
reflect the different outcomes of the Arab spring. In the case of Tunisia, Ennahda 
participated in a coalition with leftists, negotiated with secularists and toned down 
Islamist ideological claims. "Statist Islamists in Tunisia have prioritized becoming an 
entrenched, mainstream party with a say in public and political life regardless of whether 
they are in opposition or in government" (Volpi & Stein, 2015, p.288). Volpi and Stein 
argue that when Islamist parties interact in a multiparty system, they contribute to the 
consolidation of democracy. However, the opposite results when these Islamist parties 
are excluded. According to the authors, the Arab Spring reshaped the dynamics of the 
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relationship between Islamists and the state, and between statist and non-statist Islamists, 
for better (Tunisia) and for worse (Egypt) (Volpi & Stein, 2015, p.276).  
 Stephan and Linz disagree. They focus instead on the relationship between 
democracy and religion, especially in the world’s Muslim-majority countries. While 
they agree that the hegemony of religious forces in the Arab world was unprecedented 
and Islam played a central role in the Arab uprisings, they argue that the only way Islam 
and democracy can flourish is with a considerable degree of institutional differentiation 
between religion and state- which is the case in Tunisia. Therefore, religious authorities 
should not exert control over democratic officials and, in return, democrats should not 
control religion in the country. The key issue is that democracy can flourish in 'multiple 
forms' of democracy, and not necessarily through the strict separation between religion 
and state. More importantly, the concept of 'civil state' is becoming extremely prominent 
in Tunisia. In a civil state, religion respects that people are free to make their own laws. 
Both, Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali of Ennahda, spoke expansively of the political 
necessity of a ‘civil-state'. Both have been vocal about respecting Tunisia's history as a 
progressive Arab country with women-friendly codes. Moreover, some influential 
Islamist advocates used "key koranic concepts of consensus, consultation, and justice to 
argue that democracy will be most effective and legitimate if it relates to the specificities 
of its citizens' histories in a particular state"(Linz & Stephan, 2013, p.18). Accordingly, 
the newly adopted Tunisian constitution was ratified without any reference to the word 
"sharia". 
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2.8 The Role of Political Agents and Elites in Transitions 
 Gerardo L. Munck (2015) highlights a factor that is often missed in democratic 
transition studies: political agents. Munck focuses on transitions and post-transition in 
Latin America. He states that democratization, if achieved, is not necessarily permanent 
and that electoral democracy should always be defended. Recent developments in post-
Arab Spring states have showed that gains attained through democratic transitions 
should not be taken for granted. Achieving electoral democracy is not adequate during a 
transitional period. Studies have shown that as soon as elected officials assume office, 
the nature and value of democracy becomes a subject of contestation (Munck, 2015). He 
suggests that various political-ideological actors affect the course of democracy through 
their impact on the political institutions of decision-making and the social environment 
of politics. Consequently, the problem is not which type of democracy is adopted, but 
rather the political agents themselves whose support for democracy depends on their 
interests. This takes us back to the argument regarding the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy. Can Islamist parties operate in democratic institutions and respect their 
democratic rules? Does participating in elections moderate their beliefs or will they 
attempt to change the rules of democracy once they assume office? 
  Similarly, Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz (2014), attempt to 
study transitions from a different perspective. They introduced a new data set that 
studied transitions in 280 countries from 1946 to 2010.  The study aims to explore why 
autocratic breakdowns do not always lead to democratization, but rather to the 
establishment of new autocratic regimes. Democratization is more likely to happen after 
opposition election victories and not after popular uprisings (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 
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2014). What factors lead to chaos or renewed autocracy after an authoritarian 
breakdown? Statistics show that the type of regime and the level of violence applied 
during transition affects the likelihood of democratization. For example, personalist 
dictatorships are less likely to democratize than dominant party regimes. The figures 
show that there is a "67 percent probability of democracy after the dominant party 
regimes (Tunisia and Egypt) and 50 percent after the personalist (Libya and Yemen), all 
else equal" (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014, p.327). This investigation shows that 
democratization is more likely to follow a dominant-party regime and has higher 
prospects when the level of violence during the uprisings is moderate. In this study, 
Tunisia was coded as a dominant party regime and the level of violence, post 
authoritarian breakdown, was registered in the moderate category.  
 John Higley and Michael G. Burton (1989) give special attention to the role of 
elites in transitions. They also argue that democratic transitions and breakdowns can be 
best understood by focusing on the internal relations of national elites. National elites 
are defined as persons who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and 
considerably (Higley & Burton, 1989). The authors recognize that many identity 
cleavages or forces affect the forms of political regimes. Nonetheless, they see the 
national elite acting as a filter for these forces. Consensual unity of national elites 
heavily impact regime stabilization. As long as national elites are unified, the regime 
remains stable. Consensually unified national elites, a rarity, produce stable regimes. 
However, divided national elites lead to unstable regimes that tend to oscillate between 
democratic and authoritarian rule (Higley & Burton, 1989). In Syria, the regime was 
only just able to survive because it had the support of the economic and political elites. 
 27 
On the other hand, the national elites in Tunisia sided with the protestors and thus 
ensured a smooth democratic transition. 
 
2.9 Change and Continuity 
 Adham Saouli (2015), Hinnebusch (2015) and Joshua Statcher (2015) shift the 
discussion away from “transitology” theory and focus instead on change and continuity 
in the Arab world in order to have a better understanding of the uprisings. The recent 
uprisings that took place in the Arab world further augmented the course of state 
disintegration, which is partly caused by the long-standing state-building process in the 
post-colonial era (Saouli, 2015). Colonial divisions gave rise to different political 
ideologies (Islamist, Nationalist, Baathist etc...), reflecting the socio-economic 
grievances of the time. However, since democratic institutions were non-existent, the 
military became the only avenue for political change. Transforming the military into an 
agent for political change had serious repercussions. However, apart from coups that 
swept the Arab world in the late 1960s, patterns of judicial, social and economic 
institutions were determined by monopolizing the means of violence. Hence, returning 
back to the process of state formation and understanding the genealogy of state 
structures is crucial to comprehend the interchangeable relation between coercive power 
and its counter resistance in the Arab world (Saouli, 2015). Saouli draws attention to 
‘variables’ that constrain the democratization process. These variables include, but are 
not limited to, sectarian and ethnic identities, geopolitical rivalries and collective 
violence. The Arab uprisings in Iraq and Syria challenged the existing political order and 
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were an opening to renegotiate the political rules in the two countries. However, geo-
political locations, heterogeneous social compositions and coercive state-building in 
Syria and Iraq led to their disintegration (Saouli, 2015). Unlike other Arab Spring states, 
Tunisia, a homogenous society, was not susceptible to ethnic and sectarian mobilization 
and was not exposed to geopolitical intervention. 
  After an authoritarian breakdown, most transitologists tend to believe that after a 
certain period of ambiguity, democratization either moves forward, or a return to 
authoritarianism is expected. Nonetheless, with the exception of Tunisia, the trend in the 
Arab spring states is neither democratization, postponed transition, nor a return to 
authoritarianism (Statcher, 2015). Today, countries like Syria, Bahrain and Libya are 
undergoing a process of regime re-making. Statcher describes the past four years in the 
Arab world as a remaking of state-society relations. Political and militarized state 
violence deployed by elites after a break from authoritarian rule should be analyzed. The 
central frame for analyzing the Arab uprisings should be the elites who employ 
unprecedented levels of violence against their population to prevent them from 
establishing new orders (Statcher, 2015). Before the Arab uprisings, the region was not a 
stranger to the “soft-violence" practiced by autocratic regimes. Arab regimes were 
notorious, and to some extent, still are, for their secret service intelligence. However, 
regimes that explicitly give orders to kill their activists and citizens were uncommon. 
Then the Arab Spring happened. The uprisings ushered the most violent period in the 
history of the contemporary region (Statcher, 2015). The violence deployed by regimes 
on ordinary citizens hindered democratization, empowered radicals, and militarized the 
army. In Tunisia, the elites sided with the demonstrators and did not deploy state 
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militarized violence against those pushing for more freedoms, more social justice, and 
better economic prospects. Moreover, Tunisia's apolitical and relatively small army kept 
state violence to a minimum. Unlike Syria and Iraq, Tunisia’s elites facilitated the 
democratic transition. 
  In order to explain the different trajectories that resulted after the Arab 
uprisings, the scale of mass mobilization and the capacity of opposition to split the 
regime, Hinnebusch (2015) presents two factors: anti-regime mobilization and variations 
in authoritarian resistance which provides context to post-uprising agency. Hinnebusch 
turns to two theoretical approaches to explain the Arab uprisings: modernization theory 
and Marxist theory. Moreover, Hinnebusch relies on Social Movement Theory and the 
transition paradigm to further understand the depth of the crisis in each Arab country. 
Hinnebusch states that the depth of the crisis in each country is relative to the degree of 
economic blockage and the imbalance between social and political incorporation. 
According to Hinnebusch, the transition in Tunisia was successful because anti-regime 
mobilization was high due to Tunisia’s active and homogenous society, and 
authoritarian resistance was low due to the state’s autonomous apparatus. In Tunisia, 
state institutions enjoyed relative autonomy of the authoritarian leader. Most 
importantly, it was not identified with a particular identity group. Consequently, the state 
apparatus allowed the removal of Ben Ali. Moreover, in the case of Tunisia, insider-
outsider coalitions united in order to engineer a peaceful exit of the president. In Syria, 
for example, the unorganized mass protests could not bargain with the regime. Thus, 
they tended to make maximalist demands or resorted to violence which sharply reduced 
the likelihood for democratization. For Hinnebusch, where anti-regime mobilization 
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remains peaceful, moderates within the regime become more willing to push for reforms 
and/or withdraw their support from authoritarian hardliners. Additionally, the balance 
between bureaucratic capability and personal authority affects the resistance’s capacity 
of authoritarian regimes. Thus, “where the bureaucratic capacity is high relative to the 
patrimonial authority, loyalty to the leader is low but its capacity to sustain state 
establishment is high” (Hinnebusch, 2015, p.214). 
 
2.10 Arab Spring States 
 The Arab Spring did not generate similar results. For many reasons, post-
uprising Arab Spring states underwent divergent trajectories. Consequently, democratic 
transition did not transpire in any of them except for Tunisia. The following section 
discusses the different pathways adopted by post-uprising Arab Spring states. 
2.10.1 Egypt 
 On 25 January 2011, thousands of Egyptians poured into Tahrir Square, in 
central Cairo, denouncing the security forces and demanding the resignation of former 
president Hosni Mubarak. Several weeks later, and after 30 years in power, Mubarak 
stepped down on 11 February 2011. Immediately after, the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF), led by Field Marshal Mohamad Hussein Tantawi, the country's 
defense minister, took on the transitory rule of the country. From the start, SCAF's 
commitment to a real political change was unclear. In fact, the military played a very 
negative role in the Egyptian transition process. It made very little effort to discard the 
old system of power that continued to pervade all chief institutions. Moreover, the 
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constitution-reform process was plagued by ambiguities. The SCAF had appointed a 
committee to amend several articles within the constitution. Two weeks later, on 19 
March 2011, 77 % of Egyptians approved the amendments. Nonetheless, the process of 
constitutional reform was imposed from above and it gave no space for public debates 
and feedback (Paciello, 2011). Furthermore, the SCAF was heavily involved in the 
electoral rules for Egypt's first elections. Although the parliamentary elections were 
conducted in a relatively fair manner, the electoral rules were in fact not agreed upon in 
an inclusive manner (Bellin, 2011). Therefore, this raised serious concerns regarding the 
legitimacy of the electoral process. In addition, the political players’ commitment to 
democratic rule in Egypt is uncertain. In June 2012 Muslim Brotherhood candidate, 
Mohammad Morsi, won presidential elections. After Morsi's election, tensions started to 
escalate between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the secular opposition.  
Thousands of Egyptians took to the streets to protest the approval of a draft constitution 
that promoted the role of Islam and restricted freedom of speech in the assembly. Almost 
a year later, Morsi was ousted by the army amid mass demonstrations calling for his 
resignation. Taking into account the country's political and economic challenges, the 
chances for a swift and easy democratic transition in Egypt are not very high.  
2.10.2 Bahrain 
 Amongst the other Gulf States, Bahrain was affected the most by the Arab 
Spring. On 14 February 2011, demonstrators went down to the Pearl Roundabout, in 
central Bahrain, to demand political freedom and social justice. The demonstrations 
were peaceful and organized. However, on the first day, one demonstrator was killed by 
Bahraini security forces. This exasperated the protestors furthermore and eighteen hours 
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later, four other protestors were killed. The clashes and the killing of the protestors was a 
dangerous development that signaled the beginning of a possible sectarian strife. The 
willingness of the Bahraini security forces to confront the protesters, fueled by the 
"otherness" of the protestors being mostly Shi’a in contrast to the Sunni royal family and 
military elite, constituted the main difference between the Bahraini uprising and that of 
Tunisia and Egypt (Bellin, 2011). The Peninsula Shield Force, mainly the Saudi 
military, entered Bahrain on 16 March 2011. The military cleared all the roundabouts 
from the protestors by force and the Bahraini security forces arrested most activists, 
including women. Within days, the Bahraini uprising was over and the monarchy was 
saved by the Saudi regime. Up to this date, the Bahraini regime has engaged in 
significant repression against any opposition. As long as Bahrain enjoys the support of 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, the outcome of any uprising will inevitably be 
similar and a democratic transition will never transpire. 
2.10.3 Syria 
 To this date, Syria remains the most tragic case of all Arab spring states. In 
March 2011, peaceful demonstrators erupted in Daraa governorate, located south of 
Damascus. Initially, the protestors were peacefully calling for political freedom. In a 
swift response, president Asad made a few concessions: the end of state-emergency law, 
the right of Kurds to claim Syrian citizenship and the promise of economic reforms. 
However, Syria continued to witness a continuous rise of non-violent protests in 
different Syrian regions.  The Syrian security apparatus and army started responding 
with severe brutality and violence. Protestors were arrested, imprisoned, tortured and 
killed and many Syrians were persecuted by the Assad regime on account of their faith 
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(Sunni), or their real or perceived political opinion. Few defections from the military 
took place and the defectors organized themselves mainly under the Free Syrian Army. 
Nevertheless, the security apparatus, composed mainly of Alawites and a few Sunni 
elites, remained faithful to the president. As the crisis spiraled out of hand, insurgents 
and Muslim extremists took advantage of the power vacuum and announced the creation 
of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). To further complicate matters, regional and 
international countries and non-state actors military intervened in Syria. While some 
military interventions came to the aid of the Assad regime in order to fight terrorists and 
other non-armed opposition groups, other military operations intervened to fight the 
Assad regime and also the terrorist organizations. Ironically, president Assad won the 
presidential elections in 2014 while the country was, and still is, engulfed with civil and 
regional wars. For the time being, a quick resolution or a democratic transition in Syria 
is unforeseeable anytime in the near future.  
2.10.4 Libya 
 Inspired by other Arab countries, Libyans revolted against their dictator 
Muammar Gaddafi in January 2011. Similar to Syria, protests initially started as non-
violent but quickly escalated to armed clashes with the state's security forces. As clashes 
increased, Gaddafi's rage against the protesters mounted. In March 2011, Gaddafi 
threatened to attack the rebels in a televised speech. This required a quick response from 
the international community, and the NATO decided to intervene. The military 
intervention in Libya, which lasted around six months, came to be known as the “boots 
off the ground" operation. In the beginning, this operation was deemed successful as it 
was able to bring down an authoritarian regime with the lowest numbers of casualties 
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possible. In August 2011, Gaddafi was captured by the National Transitional Council 
forces, sodomized and killed on video. The National Transitional Council, established in 
February of 2011, announced Libya a liberated country in October of that year. 
However, the removal of Gaddafi did not guarantee a smooth transition in Libya. Rather, 
the Libyan state slid into civil war soon after. Although it witnessed relatively fair 
elections in 2012, Libya has been witnessing armed clashes between two self-
proclaimed governments. Also, Libya has been struggling with the expansion of ISIS 
and the proliferation of weapons on its soil. Among other Arab spring states, perhaps 
Libya suffers the most from the lack of nationhood. Loyalty to the state is secondary to 
tribal and ethnic allegiances, which greatly affects the transition process. In early 2016, 
the UN had supported the creation of a unity government, however, to this date, it did 
not receive the needed support in Libya. 
2.10.5 Yemen 
 Demonstrations in Arab spring states prompted the Yemeni uprising in early 
2011. Quickly enough, protests evolved into armed clashes and in June 2011, President 
Ali Abdullah Saleh had to seek medical help in Saudi Arabia as he was injured from a 
rocket attack. Saleh's deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, assumed power and later 
formed a unity government. In February 2012, Hadi was officially inaugurated as 
president of Yemen after uncontested elections took place. Moreover, a national 
dialogue was initiated in Yemen in order to absorb the political polarization happening 
at that time. After much deliberations the national dialogue conference was able to agree 
on document that was considered the basis of the constitution. Furthermore, in early 
2014, a presidential panel approved the federation of Yemen into six regions. Up until 
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that date, the transitional process in Yemen, although violent, was evolving. However, 
Yemen and Libya have a lot in common. Tribal and ethnic divisions in Yemen remain 
the biggest challenge for the central authority. In the summer of 2014, Houthi rebels 
who are Shi'a tribesmen of North Yemen managed to take over the capital of Yemen. 
However, president Hadi was able to flee south to Adan city. While Yemen was facing 
the Houthi rebels, ISIS carried out its biggest suicide bombing attack that targeted Shi'a 
mosques in March 2015. As the Houthi's advanced in Yemen, president Hadi was forced 
to flee Adan. This time, Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states intervened and 
launched air strikes against the Houthis. The Gulf coalition was able to retreat the 
advancement of the Houthi's and reinstate president Hadi back to Adan in May 2015. 
Due to armed clashes and turmoil in Yemen, democratic transition is seen secondary to 
security concerns. 
 The events of post-uprising Arab spring states challenge traditional transitology 
theories. The current political and social dynamics of these countries expose unusual 
patterns. Rather than a linear democratic transition process, post-uprising Arab countries 
are going through violent patterns of incessant change and continuity. 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
 Democratic transitions are often complex and lengthy. Transitions to 
democracies start when a split between hard-liners and soft-liners within an authoritarian 
regime takes place. To further understand the process of democratic transitions, it is 
crucial to understand two things: Why did the split occur?  And why did it occur at that 
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specific time? Economic grievances and desire for political freedom are two of the most 
important factors that can lead to an authoritarian breakdown. In addition, some scholars 
argue that economic development increases the prospects for democratization. 
 After an authoritarian breakdown takes place, political choices determine the 
type of institutional design that should be applied. Thus, the nature of transitions 
depends on the rational choices adopted by different political actors. 
 Five years after the uprisings, Tunisia has emerged as the only country with 
serious prospects for a democratic transition. It is a country with longstanding effective 
state structures and institutions. Tunisia, a homogenous country, did not experience 
identity divisions. It is a country where the majority of its population identify themselves 
as Arabs and adhere to the Sunni Muslim religion. The institutions in Tunisia proved to 
be the pillars of social order post-authoritarian breakdown. The strength of these 
institutions coupled with a strong sense of national identity meant that most citizens 
were committed to the transition process. Moreover, due to the social struggle and 
considerable autonomous strength of the labor movements, led by the UGTT, a 
constitutional settlement was achievable in Tunisia. Furthermore, Tunisia’s small and 
ineffective military, its institutional differentiation between state and religion, and its 
geo-political insignificance helped in avoiding institutional paralysis that has affected 
other Arab spring states. In addition, post-uprising agencies’ commitment towards 
negotiation and consensus-building ensured a smooth democratic transition. After 
understanding the factors affecting democratic transitions, the next chapter specifically 
explains the cause of the Tunisian Uprising and why it happened in 2011. 
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Chapter Three 
The Factors Behind the Tunisian Uprising in 2011 
3.1 Introduction 
 Egypt has often been seen as a regional pace-setter. The pan-Arabism of 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser was able to mobilize the entire Arab world, 
especially during the 1950s and 1960s. However, the rest of North Africa was never 
regarded as a medium of ideological and political change in the Arab world (Brynen, et 
al 2012). Nonetheless, this changed with the start of the Tunisian uprising. Tunisia's 
protests, and the exile of its dictator Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia, ignited a spark in the rest 
of the Arab world. Soon afterwards, the fire caught up and spread to several Arab 
countries. Tunisia gave birth to the Arab Spring. A small quiet country in North Africa 
changed the course of the Arab world for years to come and became a success story for 
post-uprising Arab Spring states. Much has been said about the causes of the Arab 
uprisings. The popular protests were largely centered around issues such as economic 
reforms, social justice, freedom and equality. Following the Arab uprisings, scholars 
have been engaged in debates about the resilience of authoritarianism in the Middle 
East, the causes of the Arab uprisings and its impact on regional and international 
politics. However, as noted earlier, it is one thing to understand what caused the Arab 
uprisings, and another to understand why the uprisings started in Tunisia at the end of 
2010. 
 This chapter answers the puzzling question as to why the uprisings started in 
Tunisia in December 2010. It starts with a brief summary of the political history of 
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Tunisia. Economic liberalization policies are central in this chapter. The neo-liberal 
economic policies and reforms adopted under Ben Ali's rule will be presented and 
analyzed. Moreover, the repercussions of the Gafsa Mining Basin revolt that took place 
in 2008 under Ben Ali's rule will be assessed. In addition, the role of social media in the 
uprisings will be clarified. This chapter concludes that the causal link between the neo-
liberal policies adopted in Tunisia and the uprising should not be undermined. 
 
3.2 History of Tunisia 
 Unlike other Arab countries, Tunisia's struggle for independence from French 
colonial rule was relatively peaceful and systematic. For example, French colonial rule 
evicted thousands of aboriginal Algerians and destroyed social and political structures in 
Algeria. On the contrary, "defending French interests in Tunisia did not require 
extensive colonial settlement or other measures that destroyed Tunisia's traditional social 
and political order" (Alexander, 2010, p.34). This distinction helps us understand why it 
was civil servants, and not militia fighters, in Tunisia that led the process of nation 
building in the country (Alexander, 2010). In March 1956, Tunisia gained its 
independence from the French under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba and the Parti 
Socialiste Destourien (PSD). Bourguiba and his government implemented extensive 
policies to secularize and modernize the country. The PSD party, mainly composed of 
unified national elites, emphasized the importance of national unity in Tunisia. Although 
this national unity proved to deter political gridlock in Tunisia that consumed most post-
independence countries, it created ambiguity regarding its policies. Hence, bitter 
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rivalries between PSD party members and society at large were generated (Alexander, 
2010). 
 Under Bourguiba, Tunisia's foreign policy was in favor of the West. Moreover, 
the ruling party members regarded themselves as agents for secular modernization and 
social development (Brynen, et al, 2012). Bourguiba and his government implemented 
extensive policies to secularize and modernize the country. The president abolished 
habouslands, usually held as an endowment to support private or public institutions, and 
sharia' courts, outlawed polygamy, granted women divorce rights, characterized 
marriage as a chosen contract that required the bride’s consent and set a minimum age 
for marriage (Alexander, 2010). These actions intensified the opposition against him, 
which in turn led Bourguiba to declare himself president for life in 1975. Other than the 
PSD party, Bourguiba did not allow any other political party to participate in the 
government and little room was given to the development of the private sector. Despite 
the introduction of a multi-party system in Tunisia, the opposition against Bourguiba 
hardened and he was later ousted by a coup led by his Prime Minister Zine El-Abidine 
Ben Ali in 1987 (Perkins, 2004). 
 Two individuals shaped the modern Tunisian state: Bourguiba and Ben Ali. 
Tunisia became a “state in the service of the party, party in the service of the president” 
(Perkins, 2004, p.130). In his first presidential year, Ben Ali launched wide range 
reforms and pardoned thousands of political thinkers. To celebrate his new leadership, 
Ben Ali renamed the PSD party the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique 
(RCD). He built a very centralized system that was less personalized than Bourguiba and 
was able to establish a coercive apparatus for the state. Moreover, Ben Ali chose to 
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assimilate the UGTT, the trade union and the Islamist Ennahda party in the political 
process. Ben Ali carefully engineered these reforms in a way that made it impossible for 
any candidate, beside himself, to win the presidency. Still, the economic policies under 
Ben Ali's rule remained liberal. The gross domestic product (GDP) grew around 5 
percent per year between the 1990s and 2000s, the main recipients of these economic 
benefits were those close to Ben Ali's clan and the RCD party (Brynen, et al, 2012). The 
favoritism applied by Ben Ali towards his family and his small network of trustees 
generated a well connected group of crony capitalists that were becoming increasingly 
more powerful. 
3.2.1 Islam Under Bourguiba and Ben Ali 
 Political Islam has existed for decades in Tunisia. Partly as a response to 
Bourguiba’s secular state, a politicized Islamist movement emerged in the 1960s. In the 
beginning, the government was not threatened by the rise of these movements. At that 
time, there was little evidence suggesting that the Islamist movement in Tunis could re-
emerge to play an important role in Tunisia's political scene. However, due to the change 
in the political climate in the late 1970s, Bourguiba was forced to turn to drastic 
measures. On 5 December 1980, the Tunisian police arrested two prominent members of 
the Tunisian Islamic movement: Salah Karkar and Ben 'Issa Dimni. For a week, Karkar 
and Dimni were tortured and forced to hand in crucial information about the movement. 
This incident proved to be essential for the Islamist movement in Tunisia. Afraid that the 
information attained might be misrepresented or misused by the Bourguiba regime, 
Ghannouchi suggested to formalize the Islamist movement. Of course this was resisted 
by most leaders in the Islamist movement. Ghannouchi was accused of collaborating 
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with the enemy (Regime) and with the Kufar (infidels). Nevertheless, on 6 June 1981, 
Ghannouchi announced the creation of Harakat al-Itijah al-Islami or the Mouvement de 
la Tendance Islamique (MTI) and declared that it wished to be formally recognized by 
the party and pledged its support for democracy (Murphy, 1999). The central figure of 
the MTI was Rachid al-Ghannouchi, a graduate of the Zaytouna madrasa in Tunis and 
later the University of Damascus (Murphy, 1999). In the late 1980s, MTI’s leaders 
changed the party’s name to Hizb Ennahda, the Renaissance Party, to abide by a law 
forbidding party names to contain religious references (Alexander, 2010).Five weeks 
later, Bourguiba's regime arrested and imprisoned Ghannouchi and other leaders of the 
MTI party. As soon as Ben Ali assumed office, Ghannouchi was granted amnesty on the 
one condition that the latter agrees publicly to distance himself from the political scene. 
 Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali had no tolerance for Islamist parties and as the state 
restricted religious expression, the Islamists directed their support towards social justice 
and resisting Western influence, rather than focusing on issues of personal faith. In the 
modern history of Tunisia, Islam has always been associated with political opposition. 
“Bourguiba’s primary rival during the nationalist struggle and the early years after 
independence emphasized traditional Islamic and pan Arab values. In the early 1980s, 
Islamist organizations emerged again as the most powerful opposition to Bourguiba and 
then to Ben Ali” (Alexander, 2010, p.121). 
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3.2.2 The Evolution of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) 
 The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) was formally established in 1946, 
ten years before independence. The union attracted the majority of the Tunisian workers 
and provided strong commitments to social justice.  
 "For Borguiba [sic], the union was regarded as an asset and thus, he provided the 
UGTT with skilled leadership and financial support. In return, the UGTT offered their 
support to Borguiba and his political party. In 1956, the UGTT was able to secure almost 
two dozen seats in the National Assembly and four of its prominent leaders secured 
ministerial positions" (Alexander, 2010).  
 Consequently, the union grew more ambitious and started asking for a 
comprehensive social and economic reform. These actions greatly threatened 
Bourguiba's interests as he was not prepared to hand over his party to the union. 
Controlling the UGTT was of particular interest for Bourguiba. "One way of suppressing 
the radical ambitions of the union was to sustain its character as a national organization 
in constant dialogue with the party" (Murphy, 1999, p.53). For the following years, the 
UGTT's relations with Tunisia's authorities (Bourguiba and Ben Ali) oscillated between 
periods of relative peace and autonomy and periods of struggle and opposition. As an 
example, in 1987 the UGTT was severely persecuted and its leaders subjected to 
arbitrarily arrests and imprisonment. On the other hand, the union had pledged its 
support for the government and to Ben Ali policies in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the UGTT 
remained the largest and most effective influential group in Tunisia. "Having a legal 
right to challenge employers, including the state itself, provided political ground for the 
UGTT distinct from that of the party itself, radicalizing, politicizing and ultimately 
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professionalizing the union within a philosophical framework that accepted the 
legitimacy of conflict and confrontation" (Murphy, 1999, p.54). 
3.2.3 The UGTT and Islamist Movement as Opposition 
 Bourguiba and Ben Ali retained tight control over the social and political scene 
in Tunisia. In fact, both presidents left limited political openings for formal political 
actors or parties or any effective and political mobilization for that matter. This 
exaggerated oppression explains the character of Tunisia's opposition from the late 
1960s and onwards. Despite their ideological differences, the UGTT, the Islamist 
movement (later Ennahda) and other movements were compelled to work together on 
several occasions. For example, in June 2003, Tunisia's major opposition parties 
"Ennahda, Ettakatol, the Congress for the Republic, and the Progressive Democrats-
signed an agreement in France that stipulated that any future elected government would 
have to be founded on the sovereignty of the people as the sole source of legitimacy; that 
the state, while showing respect for the people's identity and its Arab-Muslim values, 
would guarantee the liberty of beliefs to all. Furthermore, the parties demanded the full 
equality of women and men" (Durac, 2015, p.253). 
 
3.3 Economic Liberalization 
 Post colonial discourse heavily impacted the way Arab leaders chose to 
implement economic policies. Most Arab leaders decided to nationalize the private 
sector and enhance the growth of the public sector. These economic policies were not 
randomly chosen. On the contrary, these economic policies were adopted because 
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"newly independent regimes had to construct national economies while simultaneously 
under pressure to secure their political rule" (Brynen, et al, 2012, p.217). Surprisingly, 
these Arab regimes were able to sustain themselves until the 1970s. The region began 
experiencing rising economic difficulties due to oil price fluctuations. To cope with the 
economic crisis, most Arab countries had to adopt different economic policies.  
 Economic Development has been regarded as a precursor for democracy in 
traditional liberal thinking. Moreover, there is a strong belief that the advancement of 
democracy is greatly dependent on particular socioeconomic conditions. This idea has 
been institutionalized and articulated through a set of international policies, known as 
"neoliberalism" (Brynen et al, 2012). Neoliberalism argues that global economic 
integration paves the way towards political liberalization through: decreasing state 
intervention in the economy, privatizing state-owned property, lowering barriers to trade 
and ensuring the free flow of capital. "In other words, material interests translate into 
political outcomes, with economic decentralization pushing political decentralization. It 
is upon these assumptions that the neoliberal policy consensus of the 1980s and 1990s 
was built (Brynen, et al, 2012, p.214). 
 Since the early 1970s, the Arab world has been following the socio-economic 
prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU) and 
the World Bank. The IMF annual reports on Tunisia, Syria, Egypt and other Arab 
countries showed significant improvement regarding the economic development and 
growth of these countries. The reports have heavily accentuated the following: 
improvement of macro-economic factors, market liberalization, development of local 
capital and the improvement of the banking sector (Corm, 2012). Thus, these reports 
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relied solely on aspects such as the budget deficit, the reforms of the central banks, the 
improvement of free trade and the reduction of the size of the public sector. Looking at 
these reforms, the Arab countries showed a great degree of optimism. According to the 
neo-liberal ideology, the performance of the Arab countries was very impressive. 
3.3.1 The Bad Arab Growth Model 
 The reports of the IMF and similar institutions could not account for the actual 
problems facing the Arab world, however. The narrow variables adopted by the IMF 
could not measure the degeneration of living conditions in rural villages, the brain drain 
crisis that plagued the Arab world, low economic productivity and the proliferation of 
poor towns in the suburbs of Arab cities (Corm, 2012). What was really happening in 
terms of real the economy in Arab states? In spite of all the international reports, Arab 
economic growth and social performance had been regressing. Relying on the statistics 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO), George Corm (2012) developed eight 
strong indicators that can actually explain the underperformance of the Arab economies. 
The economies of the Arab countries are plagued by: 
  (1) The lowest rate of active population to total population: Only 45% of the total 
Arab population are active. 
 (2) The highest unemployment rate to active population: Unemployment rate in the 
Arab world is 10 %, and the unemployment rate amongst the youth appears as high as 
25%. 
 (3) Stagnation of real salaries and poverty indicators: Real salaries in MENA region 
have increased only modestly, and 22% of the Arab population earn less than 2 USD 
per day. 
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 (4) High economic growth rate dependency on external variables: The economies of 
the Arab countries are highly dependent on oil prices, tourism, rainfall and migrants’ 
remittances, etc... 
 (5) Emigration and brain drain are a major indicator of deficient growth: 54% of 
migrants do not want to return to their countries, which negatively affects productivity. 
 (6) The high concentration of investments in a few sectors hindering economic 
diversification: Investment was limited to oil and gas, tourism, banking and the 
financial sector. 
 (7) The very low level of research and development (R&D) and the absence of systems 
to support national innovation: Less than 0.5 % of GDP in most Arab countries goes to 
R&D. 
 (8) Deficiencies of external trade: The trade deficit of seven Arab countries was over 
67 billion USD for the year 2009 only. 
 The neo-liberal model proved to be disastrous to the Arab world. Institutions 
such as the IMF and the World Bank miserably failed to identify the real problems 
facing the Arab economies. Thus, the financial assistance granted to Arab countries 
partially contributed to the mounting corruption and marginalizing of the Arab youth. 
Ironically, it did not escape anyone that the same countries adopting these neo-liberal 
policies, that were supposed to foster democracy, were authoritarian countries. As an 
example, "Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s, Syria in the 1990s, and the UAE in the 2000s 
each selectively implemented privatization and investment reform with no political 
adjustment" (Brynen et al, 2012, p.225). Moreover, the selectivity in adopting 
liberalization policies generated neopatrimonial networks and crony capitalists that 
heavily benefited from these authoritarian regimes. 
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 Up until 2010, there was a general belief amongst scholars and academics that 
the neo-liberal policies adopted further entrenched authoritarianism in Arab countries. 
However, the events of the Arab Spring proved that economic liberalization was indeed 
incompatible with authoritarianism. 
3.3.2 Tunisia Under Neo-liberal Policies 
 The examination of the Tunisian Solidarity Bank (Banque Tunisienne de 
Solidarité - BTS) and the National Solidarity Funds (Fonds de Solidarité Nationale - 
FSN) is crucial to understanding the impact of the neo-liberal policies applied under Ben 
Ali's rule. The creation of the FSN in 1992 aimed to eradicate poverty by collecting 
forced contributions from all Tunisian citizens and businesses. According to Zamiti 
(1996), the contributions would then be redistributed to the construction of roads, 
infrastructure, schools, housings, as well as through new employment opportunities (as 
cited by Tsourapas, 2013). The FSN records were not included in the government 
budgetary control and its exact financial details remained a secret under Ben Ali's rule 
(Tsourapas, 2013). The BTS was created shortly after the FSN. The main objective of 
this institution was to take care of economically deprived people. The rationale behind 
the BTS was that the poor living standards of the Tunisians were equally important as 
the construction of infrastructure. Ben Ali's regime was trying to demonstrate its interest 
in social responsibility. For Hibou (2006), the BTS was "a bank without bailiffs or 
secretaries, or drivers, or files, or reference numbers. It was, at the same time, an 
instrument of economic security and social protection; it constituted, according to a 
Tunisian banker, a 'credit line with a social orientation'" (as cited by Tsourapas, 2013, 
p.29). 
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 The FSN and BTS targeted the primary economic problems preoccupying 
Tunisian citizens. However, for Bedoui (1998), the institutions created sustained 
dependency ties: "the jobs available through the BTS and its subsidiary instruments to 
young graduates were either temporary or with wages much lower than the minimum 
wage" (as cited by Tsourapas, 2013, p.29). Thus, the unemployed youth who had to 
periodically return to BTS to check new openings, became heavily dependent on state 
structures (Tsourapas, 2013). Also, the FSN created similar modes of dependency. The 
FSN did not fund infrastructure construction, instead it privatized most state-owned 
enterprises and state-farms (Tsourapas, 2013). Moreover, both institutions were 
manipulated by the former Tunisian regime to promote its own interests. As the Tunisian 
youth became further disengaged from the RCD, the BTS and the FSN were utilized as 
agents for political recruitment. "The BTS was used by the regime not only to assure 
control over a significant of the society..., but to entice the youth into joining its party 
apparatus through promises of a better economic future" (Tsourapas, 2013, p.30). 
Furthermore, the FSN was incorporated in the president's personality and Ben Ali was 
regarded as the sole person responsible for all the due credit (Tsourapas, 2013). 
 The creation of the FSN and the BTS served to falsely represent Tunisia as an 
Arab example of an economically secure, capable state. During his rule Ben Ali had 
continuously expressed his desire for political and social reforms. But Ben Ali was not 
genuine. The FSN and BTS were created to serve as state surveillance apparatuses and 
to construct state dependency ties. Under Ben Ali, the narrative was that Tunisia be 
considered an exception to the MENA region. Of course, the IMF, the World Bank and 
the EU contributed to the narrative of Ben Ali and insisted that the economic 
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development in Tunisia was impressive. Tsourapas (2013) uses Gramscian and 
Foucauldian discourse to explain the impact of Ben Ali's economic policies on Tunisian 
society. The Tunisian state was both formative and destructive. In Foucauldian terms, 
Ben Ali enforced certain rules in order to control and normalize the population. As for 
the Gramscian perspective, the state was destructive, in the sense that, those who opted 
to stay out of the system were eventually excluded from any benefits. Tunisia was 
consistently portrayed as an economically stable and efficient model state in the MENA 
region. “The regime arguably exercised a form of power that is much closer to 
Gramsci’s perception: its domination was based on narratives, and values, so ingrained 
in Tunisian society as to invalidate any attempt at dissent” (Tsourapas, 2013, p.32). 
International actors' support in consolidating the myth of the exceptional country, was an 
important aspect for the survival of the regime (Tsourapas, 2013). There are several 
approaches to explain why the international community was supportive of authoritarian 
regimes. One approach maintains that the Arab leaders were able to market themselves 
as defenders against Islamist movements and as allies to the Western powers. In Tunisia, 
Ben Ali shrewdly emphasized the threat of illegal immigration to the EU in case the 
West did not offer him support. Another approach points out that the neo-liberal model 
was the dominant discourse within the international community at that time (Tsourapas, 
2013). 
3.3.3 Crony Capitalism Under Ben Ali 
 In order to retain control, authoritarian leaders rely on a private trustworthy 
network of people. Authoritarian leaders use existing regulations and create new ones to 
benefit family members and those close to the regime. These networks are defined as 
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crony capitalists. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, crony capitalists in the Arab world 
grew fast and controlled liberalized markets and suppressed any form of competition. 
During Ben Ali's rule, twenty-two presidential decrees and seventy-three amendments 
related to the business sector in Tunisia were passed (Daragahi, 2014). More 
importantly, the cronies in Tunisia knew which sectors they needed to invest in, and 
stayed away from sectors that had heavy competition. By the end of 2010, Ben Ali's 
privileged insiders had captured over 20 % of all private sector profits in the country 
(The World Bank, 2014). Tunisia's openness to private sector development was a 
mirage. In fact, the country's economy was closed and most of the investments were 
captured by Ben Ali's crony capitalists. Tunisia's investment policies often served the 
personal interests of those close to the regime at the expense of providing fair 
opportunities to Tunisia's entrepreneurs who lacked political connections. Ben Ali and 
his close network subjugated industries, which were highly regulated, such as the 
telecoms and air-transport. Around 40% of Ben Ali's firms were subject to authorization 
by foreign direct investments (FDI) (Nucifora, Churchill, & Rijkers, 2015). Compared to 
non-crony firms, they had far higher profits and market share in industries in which 
operating rights and foreign direct investment were heavily regulated. However, in less 
regulated sectors they were less profitable than their non-crony competitors (The 
Economist, 2014). Accordingly, regulatory restrictions and politically connected firms 
were closely intertwined. After the departure of Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia, 214 
businesses, and assets worth $13 billion, including 550 properties and 48 boats and 
yachts, were confiscated from the president, his family and close associates (The 
Economist, 2014). This data is important from an aggregate economic view. Although 
the firms' profits account for less than 1% of all jobs, they made up 21.3% of all net 
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private-sector profits in Tunisia, equal to USD 233 million in 2010, corresponding to 
over 0.5 percent of GDP (Nucifora, et al 2015). Ben Ali's economic policies, consisting 
of state intervention and barriers to competition, generated a large number of 
opportunities for rent extraction by cronies that severely affected the performance of 
Tunisia's private sector. 
 
3.4 The Cause of the Arab Spring 
 The past 100 years in the Arab world have been characterized by a problematic 
relationship with the West. Domestic and socio-economic factors were always secondary 
to the struggle with colonial powers. The Arab world has been resisting successive wars, 
invasions and occupations ever since the Ottomans. Thus, Arab leaders have always 
used the concept of the "enemy" to appeal to the masses. Before the Arab spring 
uprisings, almost all the demonstrations that took place in the Arab world were either to 
protest Western/Israeli action in the region, or to show support to the leader.  
 The events of the Arab Spring changed all that. One of the most remarkable 
features of the uprisings that swept the Arab world is the absence of any reference 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict or the occupation of Palestine. Instead, the protestors 
were calling for social justice, welfare and freedom. Economic and social grievances, 
marginalization and feeling of relative deprivation were all key components behind the 
Arab uprising. "These masses who emerged in huge numbers to demonstrate together 
with other more well-to-do social strata of the population were first and foremost 
motivated by the need to improve their socio-economic situation and gain access to 
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decent employment opportunities" (Corm, 2012, p.355). Although human rights and 
political freedom were popular amongst the protesters, the real motivation was the need 
to improve their socio-economic conditions. In a recent study published by the Isam 
Fares Institute (2015), statistics show that few citizens in the Arab world regard equality 
of political rights as the most important aspect in democracy. Instead, most Arab citizens 
state that the primary feature of democracy is the provision of basic necessities for all. 
The neo-liberal policies adopted by some Arab regimes amplified feelings of relative 
deprivation between citizens and crony capitalists or regime elites. These policies 
created a tight network of politically privileged people that agitated the anger of the 
masses against their governments. In Tunisia, the Trabelsi clan’s predatory economic 
practices even alienated the Tunisian bourgeoisie from the regime, contributing to its 
own downfall (Brynen et al, 2012). It has been noted that the two countries where 
popular uprisings first took place - Tunisia and Egypt - were the two Arab countries that 
had gone to the fullest in adopting the recommendations of the "Washington consensus" 
(Gause, 2012). Surprisingly, the groups who benefited most from these policies did not 
offer their support to the authoritarian regimes during the uprisings. 
 The impact of neoliberal economic reforms helps explain the timing of the 
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the two countries most affected by these reforms. 
Nonetheless, several Arab countries who had experienced periods of economic crisis in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s were able avoid political turmoil. What was different in 
2011?  What caused this schism between elites and authoritarian rulers? And why did it 
not occur earlier? In order to understand this question, we need to examine two factors. 
The first, which is specific to the Tunisian case, is the events and the repercussions of 
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the Gafsa revolts in 2008. The second factor that needs to be analyzed is the role that 
social media played in the Arab uprisings. 
3.4.1 The Gafsa Mining Basin Uprising 
 The Gafsa region in Tunisia was home to an uprising that included a series of 
strikes that lasted about six months in 2008. The uprising, which shook the area, located 
next to the Algerian border, represented the most important movement in Tunisia since 
the Bread Revolt of 1984 (Gobe, 2011). Unemployed university graduates, high school 
students, temporary workers and the families of the phosphate mines workers all 
participated in the 2008 uprising. The Gafsa region was marginalized in both economic 
and social aspects ever since 1980 when an armed opposition tried to bring an end to 
Bourguiba's rule. 
 The citizens of the Gafsa province had initially hoped that the reopening of the 
mines in the region would create new job opportunities. Nevertheless, as soon as the 
project was launched, they discovered that most of the jobs were going to be allocated to 
people with close connections to the government. Thus, demonstrations and sit-in rallies 
were organized throughout the area.  The demonstrators demanded either to get hired, or 
to become permanent employees.  Many citizens had felt left behind during the Tunisian 
development in the two years that had preceded the 2008 Gafsa events. As an example, 
compared to 2005, price of phosphate-derived products rose by 11%, and by 47%, 
compared to 2007.  Furthermore, the prices had sky-rocketed to the extent that they were 
125% higher in the first quarter of 2008 than they were in the first quarter of 2007. This 
had a huge impact on export benefits which rose from DT 858 million, in 2005, to DT 
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781 million in the first quarter of 2008. Nonetheless, the unemployment rate in the Gafsa 
province remained much higher than the national average unemployment rate of 14.1% 
(Gobe, 2011). 
 The state-owned Gasfa Phosphate Company (GPC) was the biggest employer in 
the region, in addition to several subcontracting companies. Amara Abbassi, the 
Secretary General of the Regional Union of the UGTT, and a deputy and member of the 
RCD's Central Committee, was the owner of several subcontracting companies under the 
supervision of the GPC (Gobe, 2011). This enabled Abbassi to provide the GPC with 
additional workers. The trigger of the uprisings came after the announcement of the 
hiring contest on 5 January 2008. The unemployed graduates considered the list of the 
people hired as a denial of justice since most of them were not from the Gafsa region. 
"Following the announcement of the result, the unemployed graduates hinted that the 
Regional Management of the UGTT, headed by Amara Abbassi, favored the recruitment 
of friends and direct relatives, on the basis of tribal and political affinities" (Gobe, 2011, 
p.7). 
 The position of the trade unions in regard to the protest movements was very 
cautious. It should be noted that only the local branches of UGTT of Redeyef area 
supported the demonstrators. The UGTT local branches in the towns of Moulares, 
M'dhila and Metlaoui did not partake in the protests (Gobe, 2011). Moreover, "at the 
national level, the federations, such as that of primary education, of secondary education 
and of health, or even of the postal system, did not take any position, nor did they 
publish any press releases, or organize any support action in order to expose the situation 
in the region (Gobe, 2011, p.8). 
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 In the early days of the conflict, the police force did not intervene in the protests 
as Ben Ali was betting that the protests will soon lose their momentum. However, as the 
protests escalated and riots continued taking place in M'dhila town, Ben Ali's tolerance 
ran out. "Therefore, in early April, the authorities decided to put an end to all this by 
resorting to force, particularly versus the better organized protest movements, i.e. the 
negotiations' and the unemployed committees in Redeyef" (Gobe, 2011, p.12). The 
protests were faced with severe police and military repression. The police carried out 
raids, used tear gas bombs and arrested several activists. Violent encounters took place 
between the protestors and the police throughout the month of May. By June 2008, two 
protestors had been killed by the police. However, this time, Ben Ali decided to put an 
end to these events once and for all (Gobe, 2011).  On 6 June 2011, the police opened 
fire at the demonstrators, thus killing a young man and wounding 21 others. Ben Ali 
issued orders for arbitrary arrests in the province and his forces attacked and arrested 
representatives of the movement. Ben Ali also made some concessions. He dismissed 
the governor of Gafsa and the Director General of the CPG. Moreover, Ben Ali pledged 
to invest a percentage of the income generated from the export of phosphate in the 
region and build infrastructure in the area and create new job opportunities (Gobe, 
2011). 
 Six months later, Ben Ali was able to quell the Gafsa revolt. However, the events 
of the Gafsa revolt in 2008 proved that the hegemonic discourse that has been generated 
over the course of several years by Ben Ali and his regime was no longer viable. It 
showed that the people no longer believed that Tunisia was an exception and an 
economic miracle in the MENA region. Most importantly, the Gafsa 2008 riots 
 56 
confirmed that the Tunisians were able to voice their dissent and express their opposition 
against the inequitable policies and practices of Ben Ali and his regime. 
 Charles Tilley and Sidney Tarrow (2007) explain social movements as "repeated 
public displays of worthiness unity, numbers and commitment by such means as wearing 
colors, marching in disciplined ranks, sporting badges that advertise the cause, 
displaying signs, chanting slogans and picketing public buildings" (as cited by Gobe, 
2011, p.3). It is within this context that we can frame the Gafsa protest movements as a 
social movement. Nonetheless, this social movement failed to achieve its demands. The 
protest movements remained confined to the region and did not lead to a diffusion to 
other regions in Tunisia. Apart from the Parti Communiste des Ouvrier de Tunisis or the 
Tunisian Workers' Communist Party (PCOT), the protest movement was not supported 
by any other political party (Gobe, 2011). Moreover, the protests were not covered by 
the media. Still photos and episodes of the movement were posted on the internet, yet 
received little circulation. "The only professional images that were broadcast were shot 
by Fahem Boukaddous, a member of the PCOT, for the opposition satellite television 
channel Al-Hiwar Attounsi" (Gobe, 2011, p.20). 
3.4.2 The Role of Social Media 
 On 17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouaziz, a young street vendor, set himself on 
fire in front of the governor's office in the town of Sidi Bouzid. Bouaziz died in a 
hospital on January 4 2011, but his plight sparked nationwide protests. Even though the 
state-controlled media had ignored the calamity, the news had travelled fast through 
social media. Many Tunisians sympathized with Bouaziz's grievances as they realized 
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that they share similar injustices. "The realization hit home as people watched YouTube 
videos about the abusive state, read foreign news coverage of political corruption online, 
and shared jokes about their aging dictator over SMS. Communicating in ways that the 
state could not control, people also used digital media to arrive at strategies for action 
and a collective goal: the deposition of a despot" (Howard & Hussain, 2011, p.36). 
Videos of Ben Ali's wife’s extravagant lifestyle started appearing online. Activists and 
bloggers started circulating images of a hospitalized Bouazizi and an online campaign 
was launched to gather support for the uprising in Sidi Bouzid. In turn, the regime 
cracked down on social media. "The government tried to ban Facebook, Twitter, and 
video sites such as DailyMotion and YouTube. Within a few days, however, people 
found a workaround as SMS networks became the organizing tool of choice" (Howard 
& Hussain, 2011). Hackers such as Anonymous and Telecomix came to the aid of 
activists by building new software to help them get around state firewalls. This time, 
Ben Ali's regime responded by jailing a group of activists in January 2011 (Howard & 
Hussain, 2011). By the time Ben Ali had fled Tunisia on January 11, campaigns against 
authoritarian regimes in other countries were growing. The success of the Tunisian story 
inspired Egypt, and a few days later Cairo was home to the largest protests the country 
had seen in decades. 
 A study published in the Project on Information Technology & Political Islam 
(PITPI) in 2011 analyzed the role of social media in the Arab Spring. The study reached 
three main findings. First, political debates in the Arab Spring were primarily shaped by 
social media. Second, a spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded 
major events on the ground. This is a crucial point. It suggests that online conversations 
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played a central role in the protests that toppled governments in Egypt and Tunisia. 
Third, social media helped in diffusing democratic ideas across international borders. 
Social media conveyed a cascade of messages regarding freedom, democracy and liberty 
in the MENA region. 
 
3.5 Why Tunisia in 2011? 
 If the events of the Gafsa revolt in 2008 shook the Tunisian regime hegemonic 
discourse, the self-immolation of Bouzaiz demystified it. As noted earlier, the Tunisian 
uprising and the subsequent escape of Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia can be traced back to the 
neo-liberal policies adopted by the former Tunisian regime. Neo-liberal reforms adopted 
in Tunisia created an "insider-outsider" culture. Those who were close to the Tunisian 
regime captured the benefits and the privileges of neo-liberal policies. Thus, resulting 
inequalities and relative deprivation in the Tunisian society was a fundamental cause of 
the uprising. Nonetheless, economic grievances and political repression had long since 
existed in Tunisia. The recent Tunisian uprising was not the product of wealth 
redistribution and the growth of cronies. "The extent of state corruption was known long 
before 2011 and constituted the règle du jeu (rules of the game) in everyday social 
interactions. Popular revolts were linked to the breakdown of the hegemonic narrative 
that the regime had skillfully constructed" (Tsourapas, 2011). The Tunisian narrative, in 
which patterns of domination and repression nested, was broken the day Bouzaiz set 
himself alight. It was revealed that the state was increasingly unable to cater to 
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international pressures or to the growing demands of the unemployed youth (Tsourapas, 
2011). 
 Tunisia's economic miracle was so embedded in the society's narrative that the 
timing of the uprising left most academics puzzled. The structural consequences of 
economic liberalization and neo-liberal reforms adopted in Tunisia explain the cause of 
the uprising and the subsequent ousting of Ben Ali, but not the timing. The timing of the 
uprising is explained by the self-immolation of Bouaziz. The death of Bouaziz 
stimulated the Tunisian society and by the time he died in a hospital, nationwide protests 
were taking place. 
 Unlike the Gafsa revolt in 2008, the Tunisian protests in 2011 enjoyed the 
support of two key components that proved to be crucial for its success: the UGTT and 
the social media. Due to internal politics, most of the local branches of the UGTT did 
not offer their support in 2008 revolt. Moreover, although Tunisians were familiar with 
social media before the Arab spring, it was not until the later years of 2009 and 2010 
that social media became widely used. Therefore, the Gafsa revolt was not widely 
covered by different social media platforms and thus, could not reach a wide range of 
Tunisian citizens.  
 As an organization, the UGTT enjoys significant social clout in Tunisian society. 
It is almost impossible to find any other organization or political party that played a 
significant role in the Tunisian uprising similar to that of the UGTT. According to 
Achcar, "it was networks of UGTT activists that spread the uprising from the improvised 
interior to the main cities, and organized the strike wave that finally put  paid to Ben 
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Ali's rule" (as cited by Allinson, 2011, p.302). In other words, it was the workers and the 
trade unions in Tunisia that contributed to the success of the uprisings in 2011. The 
Tunisians regarded the UGTT as a credible national actor in the Tunisian politics. 
Hence, the UGTT was able to mobilize mass protests against Ben Ali and his regime. 
Although, the top leaders at the organization were supportive of Ben Ali, the local 
branches of the UGTT applied constant pressure on the executive board. Two weeks into 
the uprisings, the UGTT succumbed to the pressures and announced its support of the 
protests (Bishara, 2014). 
 If social media platforms did not exist, would the Arab Spring still have 
occurred? This is not an easy question to answer. Democratic activists have long existed 
in the Arab world, but never before had any toppled an authoritarian leader (Howard & 
Hussain, 2011). Moreover, although the causes of the Tunisian uprising were directly 
related to the impact of neo-liberal policies, this does not invalidate the causal 
contribution of social media. For several years, dissent had been stirring, but traditional 
opposition never proved sufficient until social media began spreading in the region. 
  Social media has significantly altered the strategies of democratization processes. 
In Tunisia, social media played a central role in the uprising. It facilitated the 
evolvement of localized dissent into a structured movement with a collective 
consciousness (Howard & Hussain, 2011). The Tunisian uprising in 2011 could not have 
succeeded without social media, and would have otherwise shared the same fate of the 
Gafsa revolt of 2008. Furthermore, social protests in the Arab world have cascaded from 
one country to another, largely due to the role of social media. In each country, 
communities were able to organize themselves around their shared local grievances and 
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come up with strategies against authoritarian rulers due to the role of social media. The 
next chapter discusses the process of the democratic transition that followed the start of 
the uprising introduced above. 
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Chapter Four 
The Process of Democratic Transition in Tunisia 
4.1 Introduction 
 The uprisings that hit the Arab world in 2011 gave a significant impetus to a 
prolonged series of socio-political transformations in the region. From the collapse of 
authoritarian leaders and the resilience of oppressive regimes, to the rise of new political 
agents, and the realignment of political and economic elites, the Arab Spring incited 
powerful developments in the domestic environments of post-popular uprisings 
countries. Within the context of the Arab Spring, the term "successful transition" to 
democracy becomes too simplistic. In fact, the outcome of the Arab Spring has been 
much more modest than many had initially hoped. Apart from Tunisia, most Arab 
Spring states are currently experiencing political change, but democratic transitions have 
not occurred in any of them. Most Arab states witnessed protests in their central city 
squares where protesters were calling for political change and economic reform. Yet, 
despite similar grievances throughout the Arab world, different trajectories have resulted 
from authoritarian regime breakdown. 
 Early observers initially predicted that Egypt would be the first, amongst 
different Arab spring states, to experience a successful democratic transition (Goldberg, 
2014). Indeed, Egypt enjoyed a far more open press environment, a strong and active 
civil society, more competitive elections and a higher turnover among ministers. As an 
example, "in 2010 the Tunisian prime minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, was the same 
one who had been appointed more than 10 years earlier by then-President Zine el-
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Abidine Ben Ali. Atef Ebeid, who former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak had 
appointed as prime minister in 1999 (when Ghannouchi assumed his office) to replace 
Kamal Ganzouri, departed after a five-year term. Ahmad Nazif, Ebeid’s successor, had 
only served seven years when he was replaced on Jan. 30, 2011. Egypt had had three 
prime ministers in the two decades during which Tunisia had none" (Golberg, 2014, 
p.39).  
 To understand why Tunisia's transition towards democracy differs greatly from 
other Arab Spring states, several aspects must be analyzed. This chapter discusses the 
process of democratic transition in Tunisia and focuses on the importance of electoral 
reforms and on the constitution drafting process. This chapter concludes that several 
factors contributed to the success of Tunisia's transition process, such as the professional 
role of the military, the choice of political actors, the social struggle of civil society and 
the inclusiveness of the constitution drafting process. 
 
4.2 The Tunisian Military and the Uprising 
 Beginning on 12 January 2011, tens of thousands of Tunisians took to the street 
demanding the resignation of Ben Ali. Large protests filled the streets of Habib 
Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis and in front of vital governmental institutions. By mid-
January, the seriousness of the situation became obvious to Ben Ali. On 12 January, 
President Ben Ali deployed the army and police to the streets. This was considered a 
significant development since the military usually played no role in policing the capital 
and safeguarding domestic security (Brooks, 2011). According to reports published by 
 64 
Amnesty International, Ben Ali had also ordered the army to use force against the 
demonstrators while the police and security forces were already using live ammunition 
as well as non-lethal methods such as tear gas and rubber bullets (Brooks, 2011). 
However, the army refused to comply with Ben Ali's orders and withdrew its forces 
from the Tunisian capital, only returning them to the streets after Ben Ali's departure 
from the country (Brooks, 2011). 
In order to explain why the military defected from Ben Ali's regime and refused 
to fire on the protestors, it is crucial to understand the history of the Tunisian military 
institution. The army in Tunisia has traditionally been weak military and politically. 
Tunisia's armed forces were established after independence. Bourguiba created the 
Tunisian armed forces on 30 June 1956, combining 850 men from the Beylical Guard, 
1,500 from the French army, and 3,000 conscripts (Grewal, 2016). Bourguiba 
intentionally decided to keep the military small as he wanted to deprive the Tunisian 
military of the capacity of carrying out a military coup. Bourguiba's task was made even 
easier due to the fact that Tunisian's troops did not play any major role in Tunisia's 
nationalist movement (Grewal, 2016). Therefore, the Tunisian military did not have the 
legitimacy to claim their right to participate in governing post-independence Tunisia. 
Under Bourguiba, the Tunisian military was heavily marginalized and deprived of 
funding. Bourguiba pursued a series of measures to undermine the Tunisian military 
from assuming greater power. As an example, he prohibited military officers and 
soldiers from voting or participating in political parties. Moreover, he placed the 
Tunisian National Guard, a paramilitary force, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
the Interior as opposed to the Ministry of Defense (Grewal, 2016). 
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Similar to Bourguiba, Ben Ali had decided to keep the military at a distance from 
the regime. Furthermore, he opted to invest in internal security services and the police to 
act as the main coercive forces of the regime (Brooks, 2011). In addition, Ben Ali had 
actively sought to marginalize the military by limiting its access to resources. Moreover, 
the Tunisian military was not responsible for the security of the regime. Ben Ali had 
decided that regime security would fall under the responsibility of the ministry of 
interior. Ben Ali moved toward a system of more personalized rule over the military. As 
an example, after the retirement of General el-Kateb in 1991, he refused to appoint a 
new chief of staff of the armed forces, which left the army without a general to 
coordinate the army, navy, and air force. Instead, Ben Ali decided to take on this role 
himself (Grewal, 2016). 
The civil-military relationship developed under Bourguiba and Ben Ali led to the 
development of an "ethos" in which the officers appeared to identify with the military 
institution itself, and not with a certain regime in particular (Brooks, 2011). "Ben Ali 
ruled through direct control and management of a small cohort of elites, who rotated in 
and out of government institutions and a clique of presidential advisors operating out of 
the palace" (Brooks, 2011, p.211). The conscious decision of the Tunisian military was 
deeply political as it created an opening for social and prestigious openings within 
Tunisian society. The military did not want to risk the integrity of its institution by 
violently repressing the protestors. Moreover, the military played an important role in 
reestablishing control under a new government in the days following Ben Ali's 
departure. Military officials supported the interim government led by Prime Minister 
Mohamad Ghannouchi, and participated in the arrest of key officials of Ben Ali's regime 
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(Brooks, 2011). The role of the military in the Tunisian uprising proved vital for later 
developments. If the Tunisian military had complied with Ben Ali's orders and 
responded to the protestors with aggression, Tunisia would have witnessed a much more 
violent and bloodier transition, if any. Had the protests been contained to rural villages, 
the situation might have ended differently, given the previous role of the military in the 
Gafsa revolt in 2008. 
 
4.3 The Role of the Interim Government 
 After Ben Ali’s departure, Mohamad Ghannouchi remained the Prime Minister 
of Tunisia. The Tunisian Supreme Court played an important part in the country's 
transition. On 15 January 2011, the Tunisian Supreme Court announced the 
incapacitation of Ben Ali and the appointment of Fouad Mebazaa, the speaker of the 
assembly, as interim president. Fouad Mebazaa was also a member of the RCD central 
committee since 1988. On 17 January 2011, Mohamad Ghannouchi announced the 
formation of a new cabinet that included members from the RCD party, and other 
opposition members. Thousands of Tunisians took to the streets to demand the dismissal 
of the RCD ministers from the government and the resignation of the prime minister. 
Ten days later, Mohamad Ghannouchi succumbed to the protestors and announced his 
resignation. However, his replacement was an even more central figure of the old 
regime. The new Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi had previously served in key 
ministerial positions under Bourguiba's rule and was the defense minister from 1969 to 
1970. Moreover, Essebsi had served as foreign minister and was president of the 
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Chamber of Deputies from 1990 to 1991 under Ben Ali. In March 2011, the interior 
minister excluded the RCD from any official activity and the Tunisian court later 
dissolved the former ruling party. Ironically, the RCD was thus dissolved under 
Essebsi's government (Goldberg, 2014). 
 The interim government was immediately faced with a dilemma regarding the 
legality of the Tunisian constitution. Some called for the abrogation of the constitution 
as it was viewed to be too connected to the old regime, and some of its articles were 
considered to be tailor-made to serve the personal interests of the former president. 
(Driss, 2011). After brief deliberations, the interim government decided to accept the 
constitution in order to preserve the current power structures and it was decided that a 
new constitution will be drafted and adopted after the transition period (Driss, 2011). 
 Although the interim government included prominent members from the old 
regime, this did not derail the democratization process in Tunisia. On the contrary, these 
political actors played a prominent role in shaping the democratic outcome in Tunisia. 
Essebsi later noted that "it was his government's responsibility to ensure that the 
Tunisian revolution did not revolve into a fratricidal conflict nor deviate from what he 
called its virtuous path" (Goldberg, 2014, p. 40). Moreover, the interim government had 
decided to avoid a constitutional vacuum that could have crippled the Tunisian 
transitional phase. Consequently, Tunisia was able to prevent militias and armed 
insurgents from assuming power since it managed to avoid the dangerous repercussions 
of a power vacuum. 
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4.4 Electoral Politics  
 After the Arab Spring, competitive elections returned to several Arab countries. 
The ballot box "reemerged as a site for hard battles between political parties and groups 
possessing widely different visions of the emerging social and political orders" (Brynen 
et al, 2012, p.147). Although periodic elections took place under authoritarian regimes, 
political empowerment and freedom were never achieved. Instead, authoritarian regimes 
organized and controlled elections through various means in order to consolidate more 
power. In addition, authoritarian Arab regimes "used districting and malapportionment 
to shape elections in their favor. Electoral districts were designed to favor pro-regime 
candidates and to underrepresent opposition candidates" (Brynen et al, 2012, p.161).  
 The Arab Spring altered the process through which elections had been previously 
managed in most Arab countries. The importance of electoral reforms has resurfaced in 
political debates in post-Arab uprising countries. Since stable democracies are founded 
on strong socioeconomic and political contracts, citizens should be able to trust their 
public institutions and value the importance of civic engagement. Therefore, it is crucial 
that electoral systems in a country reflect the public’s desires and its true choices of 
representatives. Most importantly, electoral systems define how a certain political 
system functions.  
4.4.1 Elections Under Ben Ali 
 During the 1989 Tunisian parliamentary elections, and the first under Ben Ali's 
rule, the RCD party managed to win all of the parliamentary seats. In the next four 
parliamentary elections that took place in 1994, 1999, 2005 and 2009, the ruling party 
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was able to secure the vast majority of seats. The majoritarian electoral system was used 
during the first elections in 1989, and then the dual system was implemented in the 
following four elections (Al Assaad, 2015). Nonetheless, both electoral systems were 
designed to cater to Ben Ali's ruling party and therefore left no room for an effective 
opposition. According to Rony Al Assaad (2015), starting from the 1994 elections and 
onwards, Ben Ali granted 75% of the National Assembly seats to the party that attained 
a simple majority in the elections in each electoral constituency, and the remaining 25% 
seats, were granted "proportionally" to the other parties. In this way, Ben Ali managed to 
secure 75% of the assembly’s seats to his party while the other 25% of the seats were 
distributed to other "loyal" opposition parties. 
 The introduction of a special kind of proportional representation electoral law 
helped Ben Ali absorb opposition activity within his regime. It conveyed a message that 
Ben Ali was supportive of democratic, civil and human rights principles. Yet, the reality 
was different as it allowed the regime to monopolize political representation. Ben Ali's 
actions further fueled the Tunisians’ anger and resentment towards their regime. 
4.4.2 Post-Ben Ali Electoral Reforms 
 Perhaps Essebsi's best decision was to encourage the human rights activist, 
Kamel Jendoubi, to preside over the Independent Higher Authority for the Elections 
(ISIE). This body was responsible to draft the new electoral law and manage the election 
process. Jendoubi and fellow commissioners opted for a new electoral system. The full 
List Proportional Representation (List-PR) system was chosen for the elections. The new 
law was regarded as revolutionary as it commenced new electoral reforms in the Arab 
world. The reforms included introducing a 50% quota of women candidates, 
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predetermining the order of the names on the list and alternating between female and 
male candidates, and stipulating an age principle of at least one candidate who is 
younger than thirty years old in each list (Brynen et al, 2012). 
 The new electoral system was created by the High Commission for the 
Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition. This 
body was created by Yadh Ben Achour, a respected jurist, and encompassed more than 
150 members representing Tunisian society. Thus, the new electoral law was the result 
of profound political debates among different actors, which eventually led to national 
consensus.  
 On 23 October 2011, Tunisians elected 217 members of the National Constituent 
Assembly (NCA) under the new electoral law. According to Al Assaad (2015), the new 
law required voters to cast their vote for their desired list in their respective electoral 
district. The electoral quotient (EQ) is then calculated by dividing the number of the 
overall valid votes casts (exclusive of cancelled and blank votes) by the total number of 
seats allocated in the electoral districts. Seats were then allocated to candidates who 
managed to reach the EQ. The remaining seats were distributed among the candidates of 
the list having the largest remainders, known as the simple quota.  
 Ennahda's leadership played an instrumental role in adopting the new electoral 
law. While the commission was debating different electoral laws, Ennahda opted to 
support the proportional representation (PR) system over the simple plurality 
Westminster-style first -past- the- post (FPTP) system. Some suggests that under the 
FPTP system, Ennahda were expected to win 90 % of the seats during the 2011 elections 
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(Marks, 2015). However, Rachid al-Ghannouchi insisted that it would be better to adopt 
the PR system as it would result in a coalition and a democracy-inhibiting landslide 
victory for his party (Marks, 2015). Therefore, Ennahda willingly decided to participate 
in the elections, knowing that it is most likely reducing its share of votes.  
 Therefore, the newly adopted electoral law was very inclusive and different 
political parties in Tunisia were given, for the first time, a real chance at competitive 
elections. Comparing the elections results of 2009 and that of 2011, helps us understand 
the consequences of the new electoral law. According to Al Assaad (2015), the vast 
majority of the seats in 2009 were won by one political party (RCD). On the other hand, 
more than 11 political parties were able to secure seats in the assembly with Ennahda 
winning a 37 percent plurality (90 seats out of 217) (Marks, 2015). 
 On 13 December 2011, Fouad Mebazaa was replaced by the human rights 
activist and Ben Ali opponent, Moncef Marzouki. Additionally, Essebsi had resigned on 
24 December 2011 to make way for Ennahda party leader, Hamadi Jabali. After the 
2011 elections, Ennahda entered into a coalition (Troika) with two secular leftist parties: 
the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (Ettakatol), led by opposition politician 
Mustapha Ben Jafar, and the Congress for the Republic (CPR), led by Moncef 
Marzouki. 
 The 2011 Constituent Assembly elections in Tunisia fostered inclusiveness and 
dispersed power among different political parties. More importantly, the newly elected 
NCA was to be responsible for the constitution drafting process. Thus, the full 
inclusivity reflected was fundamental during a constitution making "moment".  
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Furthermore, the new electoral system encouraged coalition-building which is crucial 
during democratic transitions. Ennahda and two other secular parties were forced to 
enter a coalition and compromise their ideological differences, or risk being left out of 
the political process. 
 
4.5 Drafting a New Constitution 
 After the election of the NCA, the expectation in Tunisia was that the 
constitution making process and adoption would take place within one year. In addition, 
the NCA was expected to establish the necessary legal framework for legislative and 
presidential elections, as well as other electoral frameworks. The one year timeframe 
was very ambitious from the start and the inability of the NCA to achieve any of its 
objectives saw the term of the assembly extend to two years. Most of the delays, 
especially at the end of the drafting process, were caused by political considerations and 
blockage. After considerable delay, the new constitution was published in the Tunisian 
Official Gazette on 10 February 2014. 
 Drafting a constitution is a very complicated procedure and is usually considered 
a turning point for countries undergoing democratic transitions. The drafting of a 
constitution mobilizes social, economic, political and security actors. Moreover, the 
constitution-making process in transitions is even more critical as it determines the 
democratic, or rather the undemocratic, path of countries undergoing transitions.  The 
constitution lays the framework for the governing relations between different religious, 
social, ethnic and cultural communities across all regions within the same country. In 
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short, an inclusive constitution is a step forward to democratic transitions. Moreover, it 
establishes the new rules of the democratic game. 
 The drafting process in Tunisia started in early 2012. The NCA members, elected 
to draft the constitution, decided that it is better to draft a new constitution rather than 
use the 1959 constitution as a base. Suspicions about Ennahda ran high among secular 
and leftist segments of the Tunisian society. Ennahda engaged in debates over whether 
or not the word "sharia" should appear in the new constitution. This further provoked 
fear among secular Tunisians. "The drafting of a new constitution emerged as a 
battleground between, on the one hand, the proponents of the sanctity of personal 
liberties and freedoms and, on the other hand, Islamist parties and Salafi groups who 
sought to include in its text a set of basic religious stipulations that could pave the way 
for future censorship and discrimination (Salloukh, 2014, p.26). The first year of the 
NCA’s mandate was characterized by a lot of turmoil. The Tunisian economy was 
heavily affected by the uprising and this generated a lot of discontent among Tunisians. 
By the summer of 2012, 170 foreign companies in Tunisia had closed (International 
Alert, 2013). Ennahda also replicated in some aspects the RCD's previous hegemonic 
practices and neo-liberal policies. Coastal areas continued to be favored economically at 
the expense of under- resourced rural areas (Salloukh, 2014). 
  The political landscape also saw important changes. Ennahda sought to expel 
RCD sympathizers from state institutions. "Ennahda -affiliated militias led campaigns to 
expel what they call RCD sympathizers from state institutions, the political sphere and 
the media, a process that should otherwise be led by the reconstituted state institutions" 
(Salloukh, 2014, p.26). The practices of Ennahda further alienated the opposition and 
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members of the "troika". Members of the Ettakatol and CPR parties were disappointed 
with their parties’ alliances with Ennahda, and therefore, defected to join other parties. A 
newcomer to the Tunisian political scene, Al Nidaa Tunis, would eventually become a 
major player in Tunisian politics. The party's leader, Essebsi, brought together a wide 
range of diverse groups, mainly leftists, with one fundamental intension: to challenge the 
mounting power of Ennahda. More importantly, Tunisia was struggling with the 
incursion of extremist's armed groups arriving from neighboring countries like Algeria 
and Libya. 
4.5.1 The Role of Civil Society Organizations 
 Of all civil society groups in Tunisia, one organization proved indispensable to 
the country's democratic transition: the UGTT. In order to diffuse the growing political 
crisis, the UGTT launched a series of national dialogues that brought together 22 
associations and 50 parties to move the transition process forward. The UGTT wanted to 
apply pressure on Ennahda as it was seen to be jeopardizing the secular character of the 
state. Ennahdha, the CPR, and Al-Wafa (a party formed by CPR dissidents) decided to 
boycott the process and declined to negotiate with Nidaa Tunis. Nonetheless, the 
dialogue that started in late 2012 had partially succeeded in easing out political tensions. 
 On 6 February 2013, opposition figure of the leftist Jebha Chaabia coalition 
(Popular Front), Chokri Belaid, was assassinated by unknown assailants. Reacting to the 
assassination, Jebha Chaabia held Ennahda responsible for his death. Jebha Chaabia 
claimed that Ennahda has been too lenient with the new emerging Salafi groups. These 
claims increased after a leaked tape of a 2012 meeting showed Rachid Ghannouchi and a 
Salafi delegation discussing a plan to assume control of Tunisia (Salloukh, 2014).The 
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UGTT called for a general strike in the country while the NCA temporarily suspended 
its activities. Essebsi and other opposition figures called for the dissolution of the 
assembly. They argued that since the Assembly had over-reached its mandate it should 
therefore be considered illegal. The opposition was heavily lobbying for an apolitical 
government composed entirely of technocrats. Another assassination took place on 25 
July 2013, targeting an Arab nationalist MP, Mohamad Brahmi. The second 
assassination halted Tunisia’s democratic transition and, for a moment, many observers 
thought that the course of the transition will be changed forever. Massive protests 
engulfed the Tunisian capital and thousands of Tunisians marched to Bardo's square 
calling for the removal of the "troika". 
 The political crisis was inflamed and exploited by the political elites in Tunis, 
including the UGTT. While Ennahda and the UGTT contributed to the development of 
these tensions, it was Nidaa Tunis that capitalized on them the most (Marks, 2015). As 
an example, for several weeks, Ennahda and Nidaa Tunis rallied competing groups in 
the capital to prove their respective support base. However, the 2013 crisis presented the 
UGTT with a valuable opportunity to regain its status within Tunisian society. The 
UGTT was able to mediate the lingering national dialogue process along with three non-
governmental groups. The UGTT presented itself as a neutral mediator that was able to 
negotiate a peaceful solution. "In August 2013, UGTT made the surprising decision to 
invite the Employer's Association, a group with which it had traditionally been at 
loggerheads, to form a 3 +1 mediation Quartet leading the Dialogue" (Marks, 2015, 
p.61). 
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 Nidaa Tunisa and Ennahda were then offered by the Quartet an arrangement to 
resolve their crisis in September 2013.The arrangement called for the resignation of 
Ennahda and the "troika" from government within a 3 weeks' notice, while the Assembly 
would stay to complete the drafting of the constitution and prepare the next Tunisian 
elections. Although, the Quartet solution overlapped with Nidaa Tunis's political and 
ideological goals, the Quartet opposed Nidaa Tunis's demand to dissolve the Constituent 
Assembly. Had the Quartet responded to Nidaa Tunis's full demands, Tunisia's transition 
would most likely be in tatters (Marks, 2015). On 26 January 2014, prime minister and 
Ennahda member Ali Laaraydeh signed Tunisia's new constitution into law and on 28 
January 2014, officially handed over power to a technocratic caretaker government 
headed by a new prime minister, Mehdi Jomaa. The democratic transition, although 
endangered, proceeded nevertheless. 
 The constitution-making process in Tunisia was mainly nationally driven. 
However various international actors, such as the United Nations and the European 
Union and non-governmental organization assisted the Tunisian government and offered 
their expertise. The NCA stressed its commitment to transparency and accessibility, 
however many members appeared reluctant to release key NCA documents to the public 
and allow civil society to play an important role in the process (Carter Center, 2011-
2014). Nonetheless, other civil society organizations were able to voice their objections 
to several articles. As an example, after the release of the first draft of the constitution, 
civil society groups defending women's rights organized large protests to object to the 
NCA's article that spoke of "complementary roles of men and women inside the family". 
Instead it demanded that the NCA redraft the article and clearly state the concept of 
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equality between men and women (Carter Center, 2011-2014). Moreover, several other 
civil society organizations organized town hall meetings across the country, encouraging 
discussions between NCA members and Tunisian citizens (Carter Center, 2011-2014). 
4.5.2 Political Diffusion 
  Most academics and observers claim that the Egyptian coup against president 
Morsi in the summer of 2013, had forced Ennahda to compromise its ideology.  
However, Ennahda had been ceding key compromises long before the Egyptian coup. 
From the first constitutional draft, Ennahda was pressured by international experts, the 
public and opposition members to soften its most controversial positions, such as the 
role of religion in state institutions and the system of governance in Tunisia. Ennahda 
had continued to retreat from most of these stances throughout the four successive 
constitutional drafts (Marks, 2015). Certainly, the final version of the constitution 
revealed the political and ideological compromises on Ennahda's part. For instance, 
although Ennahda was lobbying for a parliamentary system in Tunisia because it had 
previously won a 37% plurality, the constitution defined Tunisia as a parliamentary-
presidential system in which the president acquired more powers than Ennahda members 
had wanted. Moreover, Tunisia is defined in the constitution as a civil rather than an 
Islamic state. Also, language that criminalized blasphemy was eliminated. Most of these 
compromises were worked out between fall 2012 and spring 2013, and were released to 
the public as a third draft in April 2013, several months prior to the coup in Egypt 
(Marks, 2015). 
 Still, Egypt's July 2013 coup influenced the transition in Tunisia. The Tunisian 
Tamarod (Rebellion) movement was in fact a copycat of its sister movement in Egypt. 
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The success of the Tamarod movement in Egypt in removing Morsi from power, 
intensified anger against the Tunisian "Troika" and the government and eventually lead 
to the outbreak of the Bardo protests. Moreover, these protests reminded the Ennahda 
party "just how unique and fragile its position as a free, democratically elected Islamist 
party really was" (Marks, 2015, p.29). More importantly, the Egyptian coup forced 
Ennahda leaders to accept negotiations with old-regime members. Ennahda did not want 
to further alienate opposition members and facilitate coalition building with other 
political parties which might have eventually lead to a coup against them. Many 
members of Ennahda strongly opposed negotiating with old-regime members and 
refused the idea of allowing Essebsi and other former regime officials to partake in the 
upcoming elections. Nonetheless, Ennahda's leadership was able to convince other 
members of the party to compromise their position which proved to be favorable to the 
Tunisian transition process. The coup against Morsi "reinforced and offered new 
justification for Ennahda's pragmatism, gradualism and support for long term-termist 
compromise-tendencies manifested in Ennahda's historical negotiations and internal 
evolution, as well as the key compromises it made after the 2011 elections" (Marks, 
2015, p.49). 
 
4.6 Tunisia's Second Elections 
 Tunisia held parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall of 2014. The 
elections were deemed largely free and fair by domestic and international observers. As 
a result of the elections, Tunisia saw a change in government from one led by Ennahda, 
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to one led by Nidaa Tounis. In a two-stage-run-off election, Beji Caid Essebsi was 
elected president of Tunis, thus replacing interim president and Ennahda-ally Marzouki. 
The turnout for the elections was unexpectedly highly, reaching over 60 percent of 
registered voters (Benstead, Lust, Dhafer & Wichmann, 2014). Perhaps the most 
important aspect in this election was the peaceful turnover of power through the ballot 
box. In fact, the truism of democratic transitions lies in the second election and not in the 
first. Nidaa Tunis emerged as the biggest bloc in the parliament, taking 85 out of 217 
seats, while Ennahda was able to secure 69 seats (Greenfield, 2014). 
 For many, Essebsi's victory represents Tunisia's achievements and Nidaa Tunis’ 
victory a defeat of Islamism. However, for many others, the results of the elections were 
problematic. Given that the 2010 uprising demanded an end to nepotism and corruption, 
Nidaa Tunis' success was considered a setback for the transition (Greenfield, 2014).  
However, the new political scene that emerged in Tunisia should not be decried as the 
end of the democratic transition or, even worse, the reversal of the youth-driven aims of 
the revolution. Moreover, the victory of Nidaa Tunis in the elections should not be 
interpreted as a defeat for Islamism. On the contrary, debates over political parties and 
ideological differences in the everyday lives of Tunisians is integral to democratic 
principles. Expressing frustration over certain aspects of democracy and debating the 
different forms of democracy, should be considered a vigorous indicator of the success 
of the Tunisian transition towards democracy. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 The Arab Spring fundamentally changed political dynamics in Arab states. The 
uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen removed their authoritarian leaders from 
power. However, regimes in Bahrain and Syria managed, though barely, to survive. 
Among the Arab Spring countries, Tunisia was the only country that experienced an 
authoritarian breakdown and was also able to embark on a successful democratic 
transition. 
 Apart from structural conditions that were favorable to the democratic transition, 
Tunisia's political actors and elites were committed to protect their new democratic 
principles. Ennahda's leadership demonstrated the extent to which it was willing to 
compromise its ideological beliefs in order to move the country forward. Ennahda 
showed a great adherence to democratic principles, especially as an Islamist party that 
ascended to power through the ballot box. Furthermore, although Tunisia's military was 
relatively small and detached from the political context, it played an important 
professional role. The Tunisian military decided to defy Ben Ali's orders and refused to 
fire at the protestors. Thus, it was able to ensure that the transition from authoritarian 
rule did not involve a bloodbath. Moreover, the constitution-making process was very 
inclusive and transparent. Throughout the process, Tunisians were involved and were 
able to voice their objections and give their feedback. Of course, various civil society 
groups were central in this process. Their contribution and constant lobbying towards a 
secular-oriented constitution eventually paid off. In addition, the UGTT's history of 
social struggle in Tunisia, enabled it to broker an agreement between Ennahda and 
Nidaa Tunis in the summer of 2013, and subsequently end the stalemate. Finally, the 
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electoral reforms that were adopted in Tunisia gave a chance for other political parties to 
participate and compete in elections. In turn, this enhanced the pluralism in Tunisia's 
democracy. The next chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the information 
presented and considering the implications and future of the Arab Spring. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
5.1 Summing Up the Argument 
The self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamad Bouaziz triggered mass 
protests in Tunisia and consequently ended Ben Ali's twenty-three-years rule. The 
Tunisian uprising spilled over to other countries in the region, some of them nearby and 
some far away. The popular uprisings in the Arab world were expected to generate a 
new wave of democratization in the region. However, apart from Tunisia, post-uprising 
Arab states are either in civil war or are back to authoritarian rule.  
After an introduction to the topic in Chapter One, Chapter Two examined 
democratic transitions. The role played by political economy, social cleavages, social 
struggle, institutions, religion, and political agents and elites in democratic transitions 
were all evaluated against the Tunisian case. It is important to understand the reason 
behind authoritarian regime breakdown in democratic transitions. Economic grievances 
and political freedom are two important factors that cause a schism between hard-liners 
and soft-liners. Once authoritarian breakdown occurs, the choices taken by different 
political actors affect the discourse of the transition. As such, Tunisia is the only country 
in the Arab world to date that has experienced a democratic transition. The strength of 
state institutions, the autonomy of the labor movements, its small and ineffective 
military, state and religion differentiation, and its geo-political insignificance, all these 
factors contributed to a democratic transition in Tunisia. 
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 Chapter Three looked at the factors behind the Tunisian uprising and its 
occurrence in 2011. The economic liberalization of Tunisia and the role of social media 
were two focus points in this regard. The protesters’ main concerns was improving their 
socio-economic conditions, more so than securing their human rights and political 
freedoms. The neoliberal policies adopted by the regime further alienated the citizens 
and even the Tunisian bourgeoisie from the crony capitalists and regime elites. As such, 
this later contributed to the downfall of the regime. In contrast to the Gafsa revolt in 
2008, social media and the support of the UGTT contributed to the nationwide protests 
in 2011. These two factors help explain the timing of the Tunisian uprising and are the 
reasons why the 2011 uprising did not share the same fate of the 2008 Gafsa revolt. 
 Democratic transition in Tunisia was presented in Chapter Four. The role of the 
Tunisian military during and after the uprising and the role of the interim government 
was key in this process. Moreover, the electoral reforms and the drafting of the new 
constitution that culminated in the second elections guaranteed a smooth democratic 
transition. Tunisia’s political actors, such as Ennahda’s leadership, helped protect the 
new democratic principles and have avoided political deadlock through compromise. As 
such, the inclusive and transparent constitution-making process proved to be vital in 
ensuring a democratic transition. The consequent electoral reforms allowed several 
political parties to participate in elections, thus strengthening pluralism in the country. 
Tunisia’s small military also helped the democratic transition process by defying regime 
orders and refusing to crush the protests. 
 Although most Arab Spring states are currently undergoing transitions or 
'transformations' which might not necessarily lead to democracy, by Linz and Stephan's 
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(1996) four requirements for a full democratic transition discussed in Chapter Two, 
Tunisia seems to have achieved a successful democratic transition. 
 First, the Tunisian interim government agreed to accept the then-current 
constitution in order to conserve the political and institutional structures of the country. 
Moreover, the interim government decided to draft a new electoral law and embrace a 
system of proportional representation. The new electoral law enjoyed the support of 
almost all Tunisians as it was a break from Ben Ali's one party rule. It denied any single 
party a majority. Consequently, political parties with different ideological beliefs were 
forced to work together. Second, Tunisia's first elections, after the ouster of Ben Ali, 
were described as fair and free. According to a report published by the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) in 2011, there was a high degree of professionalism and 
dedication among the Tunisian polling station officials and staff. Moreover, civil society 
organizations were able, for the first time in Tunisia's history, to deploy monitors to 
observe the electoral process in the country. This contributed to the public confidence in 
the electoral process and added to it a measure of transparency and credibility. Third, the 
newly elected interim government had succeeded to draft a new constitution that was 
described as an inclusive document. According to a report published by the Carter 
Center (2011-2014), the Tunisian constitution, over the span of two years, significantly 
evolved from the first draft to the currently adopted constitution. It favored, in many 
instances, a relatively higher degree of protection for fundamental freedom and human 
rights. Although there has been a considerable delay with the constitution-drafting 
process (one year), the Tunisian experience can be enriching to other countries 
undergoing democratic transitions. Moreover, the constitution-making process in 
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Tunisia is a stark reminder that the process is as important as the end result. For 
instance, the strength of the Tunisian constitution drafting-process lies in the consensual 
work of the different political parties, who were forced to put their differences aside. 
Fourth, the newly adopted constitution offers a clear distinction between the executive, 
legislative and judiciary. According to a study published by the European Parliament 
(2014),  Tunisia has "embraced a new constitutional paradigm that is based on a modern 
approach to human rights protection and institutional framework that treats the 
legislature, the Presidency, the Prime Minister and his or her Cabinet and the judiciary 
as the four corners of a fairly balanced structure"' (p.16). 
 Tunisia is endowed with certain structural conditions that helped its democratic 
transitions. First, a rarity in the Arab world, Tunisia enjoys a strong sense of national 
unity. Tunisia is a homogenous state with a majority of Arabs and Sunni Muslims. Thus, 
major divisions over religious and linguistic cleavages do not exist. Therefore, Tunisia 
did not witness civil or sectarian wars after the fall of the former regime. Second, 
Tunisia enjoys high literacy levels and a relatively large middle class, in addition to 
effective civil society organizations. These factors are all conducive to countries that are 
undergoing democratic transition. The workers and the UGTT played a significant role 
in Tunisia's uprising. They were able to organize mass protest movements against Ben 
Ali and his regime and later they were able to mediate Tunisia's political deadlock. 
Third, Tunisia is blessed in institutional terms. After the fall of Ben Ali's regime, the 
state apparatus remained intact. Institutions such as the police and the military as well as 
the civil bureaucracy were able to provide law and order to the Tunisian citizens, and 
thus were able to preserve the power of the state. Moreover, the Tunisian state had a 
 86 
considerable distance from Ben Ali's regime. Thus, certain organizations, such as the 
Tunisian military, cultivated an ethos distinct from Ben Ali's regime. Consequently, the 
military refused to comply with Ben Ali's orders and decided to side with the protestors. 
Hence, authoritarian breakdown in Tunisia was relatively peaceful and smooth. Fourth, 
decentralization in Tunisia proved to be very effective. The newly adopted constitution 
in Tunisia recognized decentralization as an important structural feature of the Tunisian 
state. Decentralization in democratic transitions positively affects regional development 
and solidarity. Moreover, it encourages participatory democracy and open governance 
which are vital to the success of democratic transitions. Fifth, Tunisia’s civil society 
helped in shaping, supporting and sustaining democratic movements. Finally, Tunisia's 
political elite showed exceptional commitment to the values of democracy. The 
cooperation and negotiations between the two camps facilitated the maintenance of 
Tunisia's 'Twin Tolerations'. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Implications of the Tunisian Uprising 
 The contrast between the Tunisian and other post-uprising Arab Spring states is 
central for a remarkable number of comparative analyses. The different outcomes 
generated after the Arab Spring makes such comparison inevitable: Tunisia produced a 
successful democratic transition, while the rest of the post-uprising Arab Spring states 
did not. 
 Tunisia's experience raises important theoretical implications regarding the 
democratic transition literature. Several explanations and arguments have been made in 
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order to explain Tunisia's "exceptionalism". First, it has been repeatedly emphasized that 
Tunisia has a small and a relatively homogenous population. However ideological 
polarization in Tunisia exists between the Islamists and the secularists. In fact, Tunisia 
has witnessed two political assassinations and several months of political deadlock due 
to the deep divisions between the two camps. Second, another common argument states 
that Tunisians, in general, are more educated than other Arab countries. Moreover, some 
claim that Tunisians are more prone to democratic attitudes since they are heavily 
influenced by the French colonial era. However, a study conducted by the Arab 
Barometer reveals that by 2013, the majority of the Tunisians no longer thought that 
democracy was appropriate for their country (Grewal, 2015). While these explanations 
are not totally correct, they do ring true partially. 
 The Tunisian experience and its successful democratic transition brings about 
two important theoretical implications regarding the literature on democratic transitions. 
First, the real answer to the puzzle of the Tunisian democratic transition lies in the 
limited capabilities of its state institutions. In Tunisia, the judiciary was unable and the 
military was unwilling to partner with the Tunisian opposition (Grewal, 2015). During 
the political crisis of the 2013 summer, the Tunisian opposition organized massive 
demonstrations demanding the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the ouster of 
Ennahda. However, at that time, the highest judicial body in Tunisia was the Court of 
Cassation, which did not have the jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of electoral 
laws (Grewal, 2015). Moreover, the Tunisian army has been historically marginalized 
ever since Bourguiba's rule. Thus, it had no enthusiasm or economic and institutional 
interests in overthrowing Ennahda. Therefore, the Tunisian opposition had no state 
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institutions to partner with. In Tunisia "the opposition realized after months of protests 
that there would be no judiciary or military to come to its aid. Ultimately, it realized that 
it had to back down on its demand for the dissolution of the constituent and instead 
negotiate with Ennahda on the way forward" (Grewal, 2015, p.45). 
 Second, the geo-political context regarding the Tunisian experience was 
favorable to the successful democratic transition in the country. Different regional and 
international actors, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, 
Russia, Iran and the US played a significant role in the events of the Arab Spring. 
Consequently, the democratization process in post-uprising Arab states was heavily 
affected by different competing, and sometimes similar, interests. In Tunisia, the 
situation was significantly different. The context for democratic transition was much 
higher than in other Arab Spring states. Compared to other Arab countries, relations 
between Tunisia and regional and international actors, especially Western powers, have 
always been less complex. Tunisia has always been regarded as a special case in the 
Arab world. It lacks vital resources such as oil, is distant from the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
and is not substantially threatened by Muslim radicals and other extremists. "Even the 
enthusiastic embrace of the Ben Ali regime, especially by the French but also by the 
Americans, was abandoned within days of the start of the demonstrations in December 
2010. The security stakes were simply not large enough for Western powers to stand by 
the discredited dictator" (Springborg, 2011, p.7).  Moreover, the democratization of 
Tunisia was not regarded as a potential threat to the interests of other Arab countries. 
Consequently, democratic transition in Tunisia was allowed to transpire due to the 
relatively small risks involved for all different actors. 
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5.3 Tunisia’s Future Challenges 
5.3.1 Terrorism 
 As a result of electoral returns in the fall of 2014, Tunisia witnessed a change of 
government from one led by the country's Islamist movement to one led by a different 
party composed of politicians united in their anti-Islamist stance. However, Tunisia has 
the doubtful distinction of being the country for the biggest number of foreign fighters in 
Syria supporting the Islamic State in the year 2014 (Berman, Nugent & Adala, 2015). 
Moreover, Tunisia witnessed three terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016. The absence of a 
strong central state in Tunisia in the past four years has led to the trans-national flow of 
weapons between differed militants across Tunisia's malleable borders with Algeria and 
Libya. Furthermore, countries undergoing democratic transitions are more prone to 
terrorist attacks as police and security forces are often in disarray. Also, new freedoms 
available in democratic transitions often provide opportunities for militants to organize. 
A study published by the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brooking 
Institution surveyed 1,157 Tunisians voters as they exited voting polls in 2014 (Berman, 
et al,  2015). Among the chief concerns of the Tunisians were issues related with 
security and terrorism. Despite the polarizing nature of public debates in Tunisia at that 
time, respondents were not highly concerned with the role of religion in Tunisian state. 
However, respondents also mentioned issues related to democratic principles and the 
protection of civil liberties at a high rate. Nonetheless, there are fears of a return to 
authoritarian strategies. Following the Sousse Attacks in June 2015, Tunisian Prime 
Minister Habib Essid, declared that the government would close down 80 mosques 
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controlled by Salafi preachers within days. Furthermore, Essid indicated that he will try 
to close down Hizb Al-Tahrir (Liberalization Party), a political party that advocates the 
establishment of a caliphate under Islamic Sharia law. Additionally, the government has 
promised to move against several religious associations and tighten laws on funding for 
associations. These measurements were roundly decried by Tunisian human rights 
activists and other civil society groups, who feared the return of a police state. Ennahda, 
fearing a crackdown, decided to side with the government and asked for a national 
dialogue in order to discuss recent developments. 
Thus, terrorism or instability does not signal that Tunisia's democratic transition 
has been derailed. On the contrary, Tunisian citizens and their representatives are 
engaging in a dialogue regarding an essential tension that is intrinsic in all democracies. 
Debating the importance of balancing security concerns with issues of national security 
is a healthy indicator of Tunisia's democratic transition. 
Tunisia's President and Prime Minister have blamed the recent attacks on foreign 
groups and funding. The current turmoil in Libya, has given Tunisia's militants an 
opening and allowed them to train themselves. However, violent extremism and 
terrorism is a Tunisian creation as much as it is a foreign problem. According to Rory 
McCarthy (2015), Jihadi violence has been a problem in Tunisia for many years, even 
before 2011. Armed militants responsible for the Sousse and Bardo attacks are all young 
Tunisian citizens and not foreigners. "Sousse itself is not just a tourist resort: It too has 
produced its share of radical extremists who were involved in attacks inside Tunisia and 
who have traveled abroad to fight in Iraq and Syria with Islamic State" (McCarthy, 
2015, p.31). Therefore, in order to address Tunisia's security threat, the Tunisian 
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government should revisit the problem and offer new solutions. The Tunisian 
government should realize that terrorism is a Tunisian problem as much as it is a Libyan 
one. While border control from the Libyan side is important, it is equally important that 
Tunisians work on border control to prevent Tunisians from entering Libya in the first 
place. Moreover, since terrorism in Tunisia is largely homegrown, the Tunisian 
government needs to devise a plan in which the basic needs of under-resourced 
communities are met. This includes creating new employment opportunities and 
reassessing the educational strategies applied in public and private schools. 
5.3.2 Economic Reforms 
The recent terrorist attacks in Tunisia come on top of social and economic unrest. 
The tourism industry in Tunisia makes up to 15% of the country's economy (McCarthy, 
2015). Consequently, terrorism could lead to a serious, long-term damage to the 
country's economy. Tunisia's economic problems are not a product of the uncertainty 
and lower investor confidence that resulted after the revolution. In fact, they are the 
result of poorly designed economic policies, which were in place under Ben Ali and are 
still effective to this day. Neo-liberal reforms were at the heart of the 2011 Tunisian 
revolution. Moreover, Tunisia appears to be trapped in the economic model that was 
designed decades ago. According to Antonio Nucifora and Eric Churchill (2014), 
"Tunisia's investment regime, for example, limits potential new investment to less than 
50 percent of the Tunisian economy. Whether through public or private monopolies or 
oligopolies, dozens of sectors are either explicitly or de facto closed to any meaningful 
competition. The laundry list included telecoms, road and air transport, tobacco, 
fisheries, tourism, advertising etc..."(p26). While economists might describe Tunisia's 
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economic problems as structural, in fact, it is much deeper than that. The problem with 
the Tunisian economy is that it is based on a patronage network where only the 
privileged few are able to enjoy its benefits (Nuficora & Churchil, 2015). Tunisia's 
economic system and environment must change so that Tunisia's performance in the 
global economy can improve. This requires much deeper political negotiations and 
compromises amongst different political and economic elites than in the past. 
5.3.3 The Future of the Arab Spring 
Most would agree that the Arab spring was born in Tunisia, and died in Syria. By 
the time it became clear to observers that Egypt’s democratic transition had gone wrong, 
the situation in post-uprising Arab Spring states was spiraling downwards. How is it 
possible that large peaceful movements around the Arab world have led to fierce civil 
wars, rise of extremists and the death of millions? Today, Egypt has resorted to a new 
military rule; Yemen, Syria and Libya have all collapsed into civil wars.  
 Some writers and intellectuals have declared the death of the Arab Spring, and 
concluded that it was a harsh winter all along (Spencer, 2015).  According to many, the 
Arab Spring has all but reduced the region to terrorism and chaos. However, many are 
oblivious to the very nature of transitions. In fact, transitional processes are often 
interrupted with intervals of violence, terrorism and reversal waves. Transitions from 
authoritarian regime continue to be one of the most relevant puzzles in comparative 
politics (Munck, 1994). 
 Was there ever an Arab Spring?  Marc Lynch (2016) argues that dismissing the 
Arab Spring and categorizing the uprisings as either a failure or a success, does not fully 
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capture how they have transformed every single dimension of the region's politics. The 
Arab Spring has vastly transformed regional international relations, regimes, states and 
even ideas. Perhaps then, the right terminology to use while discussing the Arab Spring 
is "transform" and not "transition". The word "transition", in academic literature, has 
always been interchangeably used with democracy. It cannot really capture the 
significant transformations that are at the heart of the Arab Spring. 
 It has been argued earlier that uprisings do not take place in vacuum, and that 
understanding the historical genealogy of power structures within a certain state is 
imperative. Therefore, it is important that the unique context and the different 
international, regional and local actors of the MENA region are taken into consideration. 
More importantly, the success or failure of the Arab Spring should not be compared to 
other uprisings and revolutions wholesale. On the contrary, the Arab Spring should be 
assessed against the ‘changes’ or the ‘continuities’ that have occurred in post-uprising 
Arab Spring states. The 2011 Arab uprisings were indeed inspired by the desire to 
change the political and socio-economic structures of the Arab world. However, given 
the resistance of authoritarian leaders against change, and the complexities of other 
factors in the region, violence was unavoidable. The current situation in Syria, Libya, 
Yemen and even Egypt makes the Arab Spring look like a failure but eventually it will 
one day succeed. 
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